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Summary
From 2006 to 2011, the number of filed foreclosures per annum in Norway has risen by
60 percent at the national level, and in some counties the increase has been more than
150 percent. Over the same period, both the unemployment rate and interest rates have
been notably low. A bank files to foreclose a house when the debtor fails to meet his
periodic mortgage installments. Hence, the increase in filed foreclosures suggests that an
increasing number of households are unwilling or unable to maintain their debt burden.
So far, the recent increase in filed foreclosures has not been realized in an equal increase
in the number of actual foreclosures. However, the rising gap between filed and actual
foreclosures may suggest that pending losses are building up in the household sector.
This thesis seeks to understand the trends in filed and actual foreclosures and its
links to the development in household debt and housing prices. A main objective is to
assess whether the recent trends in filed foreclosures reflect an increased debt vulnerability
among Norwegian households. Furthermore, I ask whether there are factors that could
turn such vulnerability into realized losses.
In order to approach these questions, I proceed in two main steps. First, a theoretical
model for foreclosures fitted to the Norwegian institutional setup is developed in order
to shed light on possible causes of the recent developments. Second, the hypothesis of
this model is tested empirically by using a newly gathered regional data set on filed and
actual foreclosures. The data set allows me to asses the importance of several explana-
tory variables that are not included in other work on foreclosures in Norway. Morover,
by exploiting the panel structure in the data, more statistically robust results can be
obtained.
Evidence from the estimated model suggests that the growth in household debt has
been the main factor contributing to the rapid increase in filed foreclosures the last 5
years. I find strong evidence for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between
filed foreclosures, household debt and unemployment, where a one percent increase in
household debt leads to a 1.5 percent increase in the number of filed foreclosures in the
long run.
That said, I find that the development in housing prices has kept the number of actual
foreclosures down. As housing prices increase, the debtors’ collateral value increases as
well. Consequently, the bank may be more willing to refinance the mortgage rather than
iii
foreclosing the house. This, I argue, is because the bank through a refinancing deal can
earn more due to an expected increase in the housing value. The estimation shows that
between 35 and 50 percent of the filed foreclosures could end up in an actual foreclosure
in the absence of any refinancing. However, an increase in housing prices significantly
lowers the fraction of filed foreclosures realized as actual foreclosures.1
These results point to a fragile situation for a substantial number of Norwegian house-
holds. For the households experiencing a filed foreclosure, the sustainability of their debt
burden seems to depend crucially on expectations of growing housing prices. If the un-
employment rate increases, or housing price expectations fall, a larger number of the filed
foreclosures could be realized, causing an increase in actual foreclosures with subsequent
losses for creditors and debtors.
The thesis proceeds in eight sections. After the introduction and a brief background
description, a literature review is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 a description of the
legal framework of foreclosures in Norway is provided. In Section 5, I present a theoretical
model for filed and actual foreclosures. The data and methodology used in this thesis is
described in Section 6, before the results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
1All calculations and tests in this thesis are calculated using the software package STATA.
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Abstract
Over the period 2006-2011, the number of filed foreclosures among Norwegian
households has risen by 60 percent at the national level. In some counties, the
number of filed foreclosures has increased with more than 150 percent. Based on
a theoretical model for the determinants of foreclosures, this thesis empirically in-
vestigates what are the main drivers of filed and actual foreclosures. My resultes,
making use of a newly gathered panel data set covering all 19 counties over the
past 15 years, suggest that the growth in household debt have been the main factor
behind the rapid increase in filed foreclosures the last 5 years. However, the results
also indicates that the rise in housing prices have stopped this increase in filed
foreclosure from being fully materialized as actual foreclosures.
The increase in the number of filed foreclosure may suggests that losses are
building up in the household sector. If unemployment or interest rates were to
increase or, even more importantly, housing price expectations fall, a larger number
of the filed foreclosures could easily be realized, causing a larger number of houses
to be foreclosed with subsequent losses for creditors and debtors.
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1 Introduction
From 2006 to 2011, the number of filed foreclosures in Norway has risen by 60 percent at
the national level, and in some counties the increase has been more than 150 percent. Over
the same period, both the unemployment rate and interest rates have been notably low.2
Thus, given the favorable macro-economic situation, the increase in filed foreclosures seem
surprising.
A bank files to foreclose a house when the debtor fails to meet his periodic mortgage
installments. Hence, the increase in filed foreclosures suggests that an increasing number
of households are unwilling or unable to maintain their debt burden. So far, the recent
increase in filed foreclosures has not been realized in an equal increase in the number of
actual foreclosures. However, the rising gap between filed and actual foreclosures may
suggest that pending losses are building up in the household sector.3
This thesis seeks to understand the trends in filed and actual foreclosures and its
links to the development in household debt and housing prices. A main objective is to
assess whether the recent trends in filed foreclosures reflect an increased debt vulnerability
among Norwegian households. Furthermore, I ask whether there are factors that could
turn such vulnerability into realized losses.
A large literature on the determinants and consequences of developments in foreclo-
sures exists for a number of countries. The literature has established the importance of
several macroeconomic factors, such as unemployment, income, debt and housing prices
in explaining foreclosures.4 Moreover, evidence has been provided showing the adverse
impacts of foreclosures on the real economy (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2011). However, the
existing literature on foreclosures in Norway is scarce. Astrup and Holm (2009) is the only
paper that explicitly investigates the developments in foreclosures. Their paper provides
important knowledge about the characteristics of the persons experiencing a foreclosure,
yet their analysis of the impact of the macroeconomic development is somewhat limited
due to the lack of sufficient data.
Although little work has been done on analyzing the causes of foreclosures in Norway,
2Over the period 2006-2011, the unemployment rate has been at 2.5 percent on average and the
nominal interest rate has averaged at 3 percent. Source: Statistics Norway.
3The number of actual foreclosures has increased by 34 percent from 2006-2011 while filed foreclosures
has increased by about 60 percent.
4See Aron and Muellbauer (2010) and Foote et al (2009) for a brief survey of the literature.
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related work on households’ debt-servicing capacity exists.5 In a recent paper, Lindquist
(2011) investigates the sustainability of the current debt level among Norwegian house-
holds and finds that some age-segments may be unable to sustain their debt when interest
rates return to a more ”normal” level.6 I argue that the recent trends in the foreclosure
data provide an appealing supplement in the assessment of such debt vulnerability. By
looking at the number of household that already fail to pay their debt installments, the
impact of households’ debt vulnerability can be evaluated based on the agents observed
behavior.
This thesis expands the analysis of Astrup and Holm by developing an explicit theoret-
ical model of foreclosures for the Norwegian institutional setup. Second, the hypotheses
of this model is tested empirically by using a newly gathered regional data set on filed and
actual foreclosures. The data set allows me to asses the importance of several explanatory
variables that are not included in the analysis of Astrup and Holm, and by exploiting the
panel structure in the data, more statistically robust results can be obtained.
Based on the estimated model, I find evidence suggesting that the growth in household
debt has been the main factor contributing to the rapid increase in filed foreclosures the
last 5 years. I find strong evidence for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between
filed foreclosures, household debt and unemployment, where a one percent increase in
household debt leads to a 1.5 percent increase in the number of filed foreclosures in the
long run.
However, the development in housing prices seems to have kept the number of actual
foreclosures down. As housing prices rise, the debtors’ collateral value increases. Conse-
quently, the bank may be more willing to refinance the mortgage rather than foreclose.
This, I argue, is because the bank through a refinancing deal can earn more due to an
expected increase in the housing value. The estimation shows that between 35 and 50
percent of the filed foreclosures could end up in an actual foreclosure in the absence of
any refinancing. However, an increase in housing prices significantly lowers the fraction
of filed foreclosures realized as actual foreclosures.
These results points to a fragile situation for a substantial number of Norwegian
households. For the households experiencing a filed foreclosure, the sustainability of
5See for instance Poppe (2005), Vatne (2008) and Guldbrandsen (1999).
6Which seems lik a probable scenario given the interest rate projections in Norges Bank (2013).
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their debt burden seems to depend crucially on expectations of growing housing prices.
If the unemployment rate increases, or housing price expectations fall, a larger number
of the filed foreclosures could be realized, causing an increase in actual foreclosures with
subsequent losses for creditors and debtors.
The scope of this thesis is to investigate the impact of a broad set of macroeconomic
variables on foreclosures. Consequently, the individual characteristics of those experi-
encing a filed or an actual foreclosure is not considered in any depth. This has some
important drawbacks. First, the individuals that experience filed and actual foreclosures
differ in many respects, especially on their exposure to the business segment. Thus the
aggregate effect estimated in this thesis may hide important variation within the group
of those experiencing a filed or an actual foreclosure. Second, this group may to some
degree differ from the rest of the population. Consequently, it can be problematic to
infer to what extent different factors may lead to an increase in foreclosures at a more
disaggregate level.
The thesis proceeds in eight sections. After a brief background description, a literature
review is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 a description of the legal framework of
foreclosures in Norway is provided. In Section 5, I present a theoretical model for filed
and actual foreclosures. The data and methodology used in this thesis is described in
Section 6, before the results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. .7
2 Background
During the last decade, the debt-to-income ratio of Norwegian households has increased
substantially, growing from 133 percent in 2000 to about 200 percent in 2010. At the
same time, there has been a tremendous increase in housing prices with real housing prices
increasing by 50 percent in the period 2000-2010.8 This development has led the Financial
Supervisory Authority (FSA) in Norway and Norges Bank to warn against the financial
vulnerability that arises from a highly leveraged household sector.9 In particular, FSA
7All calculations and tests in this thesis are calculated using the software package STATA.
8Statistics Norway Table 09477 and 07230.
www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=bpi
//www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=finsek
9See Finanstilsynet (2012) and Norges Bank (2012).
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notes that the debt has increased most among young and low-income groups, making these
households particulary vulnerable to negative shocks. Moreover, previous experiences in
Norway and other countries suggest that the repercussions are great if households have
to tighten consumption significantly. Large parts of the business sector will be affected,
unemployment will increase and banks will have higher loan losses, particularly on loans
to small businesses (FSA 2012).
Figure 1: The number of filed (right axis) and actual foreclosures (left axis) 1980- 2011
Figure 2: Unemployment and real interest rate 1990- 2011
From Figure 2, we see that over the period 2006 - 2011 both interest rates and the
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unemployment rate have been low. Still, Figure 1 shows that during the same period,
there has been a sharp increase in the number of filed foreclosures.
Lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s suggest
that the numbers of filed and actual foreclosures may serve as good indicators of debt-
vulnerability among Norwegian households. From Figure 1, we see that the number
of filed and actual foreclosures increased rapidly during the business cycle downturn in
the late 1980s. Before the crisis, households’ debt to income ratio reached a level of
more than 160 percent, which according to a several authors proved unsustainable as the
business cycle turned.10 At the peak in 1989, about 7 foreclosures were filed per thousand
inhabitant. This resembled an increase of 75 percent from 1985. The number of actual
foreclosures tripled between 1986 -1989, where more than 3000 houses were foreclosed
annually until 1993. This contributed to great losses for the banks, and several banks
had to be rescued by the government (Steigum 2004).
Since housing prices and household debt are strongly interrelated, developments in
filed foreclosures may also provide useful information about the state of the housing
market.11 Already three years prior to the Norwegian housing market crash in 1988,
the number of filed foreclosures began to increase. Furthermore, international data on
foreclosures show that increases in mortgage arrears, delinquencies and filed foreclosures
preceded the recent housing market crash in several countries.12 The developments during
the Norwegian banking crisis and the recent development in other countries suggest that
rapid increases in the number of filed foreclosures may serve as a sign of pending losses
in the household sector. However, as only a minor share of the foreclosure filings are
realized as actual foreclosures, it is important to seek an understanding of the mechanism
behind the recent developments before any conclusion can be drawn.
10For the recent data on household debt to disposable income ratio see Jurgilas and Lansing (2012).
Both Schwierz (2004, p 122-124) and Gerdrup (2004) holds this notion. See also the Smith commissions
report to the Norwegian parliament, Stortinget (1998).
11See for instance Anundsen and Jansen (2011) for evidence on Norwegian data.
12See for instance Mayer, Pence and Sherlund (2009), and Lea (2010).
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3 A survey of recent contributions
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, a vast literature on the determinants
foreclosures has emerged. The literature has been especially concerned with the large
increases in foreclosures in the US following the collapse of the housing market at the end
of the previous decade (Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 2009). In general, researchers seem
to agree on what are the most important factors driving the number of foreclosures at an
aggregate level (Foote et al. 2009, p 5).13 Housing prices and households’ equity are seen
to determine the households’ and banks’ willingness to maintain the mortgage contract,
while negative shocks to income and borrowing constraints affects the households’ abilities
to do so.
Usually, it is the interplay between social, individual and economic factors that causes
a foreclosure (Berry, Dalton and Nelson 2009). Still, in this thesis, the individual and
social characteristics of the individuals who get their home foreclosed are not consider
in depth.14 First, both the international literature and the Norwegian literature find an
important role for macro-economic factors (Astrup and Holm, 2009; Foote, Gerardi and
Willen, 2008). Second, it seems reasonable to assume that the individual characteristics
that increase the probability of a foreclosure are fairly stable over time. Thus, in trying to
explain different trends in the foreclosure data, I argue that such characteristics become
less relevant.
The occurrence of a foreclosure is a result of an interaction between a debtor and
one or more creditors with differing interests in a complex institutional setup. Thus,
the relevant macro-economic impact on both lender and borrower behavior needs to be
considered. In that respect, the impact of a macro-economic variable seems relevant in
at least three dimensions. First, a change in a macroeconomic variable may affect the
borrowers’ willingness to stay in his house, rather than defaulting. Second, it may affect
his ability to pay, his cash-flow condition. Finally, it may change the lenders willingness
to adjust or refinance a mortgage.
13These findings are also consistent with previous literature such as Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) and
Deng, Quigley and Order (2000).
14See Astrup (2009) for details on the individual characteristics of those who have their home foreclosed.
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3.1 Impact of housing prices and negative equity
Housing price movements are generally identified as one of the most important determi-
nants of defaults and foreclosures. From a theoretical point of view, the expectation of
a housing price appreciation will increase debtors’ incentives to avoid a default, since it
makes the investment backed by the loan more profitable in expectation. In addition,
housing prices affect the debtors loan-to-value and hence the share of debtors that have
negative equity. When equity is positive, selling the house would naturally tend to be a
better option for the borrower than having it foreclosed. Thus negative equity is seen as
a necessary condition for a foreclosure to occur, at least in the US (Foote et al. 2009).
Moreover, housing price expectations may influence the lenders decision to refinance, or
to adjust the terms on the mortgages (Foote, Gerardi and Willen, 2008).
These theoretical considerations are supported by the empirical literature. Danis and
Pennington-Cross (2008) use a nested logistic specification to calculate the marginal effect
of different factors affecting US foreclosures from 1996 – 2003. The authors find that a
one standard deviation decline in housing prices increases the probability of a default
by 10 percent.15 Changes in housing prices is found to be the primary determinant of
foreclosures in Sherlund (2008). He uses a competing hazard model for the period 1992—
2007, where a large number of loan characteristics, such as the loan to value, credit scores
and interest-only features are available at the individual level.
Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008) also find an important role for housing prices, but
mainly through their effect on households’ loan-to-value. The authors exploit a data
set with individual data on household equity from 1987 – 2007 in Massachusetts. The
factors affecting foreclosures are computed in a proportional hazard model, where the
explanatory variables affect the likelihood of a foreclosure relative to a baseline hazard of
a default. The authors find that negative equity, ceteris paribus, will contribute to increase
the relative hazard of a foreclosure rapidly. A borrower with ten percent negative equity
is five times as likely to default as a borrower having 25 percent positive equity.
Yet, among the households experiencing negative equity, the number of foreclosures is
15However, their measure of housing prices is not at an individual level, which means that there might
be substantial measurement error. To account for this, they include the standard error of housing prices
in different areas and find that a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of housing prices
increases the probability of default by 41 percent.
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relatively low.16 Thus, in order to fully understand how housing prices and equity affect
foreclosures, it is important to see this equity condition in combination with factors affect-
ing households’ cash flow. Generally, the literature finds that increases in unemployment
rates, and interest payments increases the number of defaults.17 A higher unemploy-
ment or interest rate will be particularly problematic in combination with falling housing
prices. In such an environment, a homeowner receiving a negative income shock is more
likely to have negative equity. This negative equity reduces homeowners’ possibilities, as
they are unable to sell the house to repay the mortgage, and may be constrained from
being offered a refinancing deal (Foote et al 2009, p 17).
Note that for large increases in foreclosures, there might be a two-way causality be-
tween housing prices and foreclosures, a point made by Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2011).
By comparing zip codes with different foreclosure laws, but that otherwise are deemed
equal judged by a set of relevant characteristics, they identify a discrete jump in the
foreclosure propensity in areas belonging to a state with “lax” foreclosure laws relative
too a state with “strict” foreclosure laws. The difference in foreclosure laws is then used
as an instrument for foreclosures. The authors identify large negative impacts on housing
prices, residential investment and consumer demand of an increase in foreclosures.
Interestingly, the connection between housing prices and foreclosures seems to be unre-
lated to different institutional arrangement. In a paper on mortgage default in Australia,
Berry, Dalton and Nelson (2009) find that falling housing prices in combination with an
increase in rental prices is an important driver of foreclosures. Their findings, based on a
large survey of mortgagors, are relevant for the analysis in this thesis, as the institutional
setup in Australia is more similar to Norway than what is the case for the US. Neither
in Australia, the UK nor in Norway does the borrower lose his debt obligation after a
foreclosure, which is the in several US states. This means that the borrowers in both
countries seldom will have an incentive to default on their debt voluntarily. However,
falling housing prices still plays a role in Australia, but mainly since highly indebted bor-
rowers have few other options when housing prices are falling (Berry, Dalton and Nelson,
16Among the borrowers that Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008) identifies as having negative equity,
only about 6, 4 percent experience a foreclosure in the subsequent three years.
17This point is further elaborated in the next subsection. See Muellbauer and Cameron (1997) and
Bo¨heim and Taylor (2000) Li and White (2009) and Astrup and Holm (2009) for the impact of unem-
ployment.
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2009).
Aron and Muellbauer (2010) find similar results for the UK over the period 1983 –
2009. Using an equilibrium correction model, they find that a one percent increase in the
share of households with negative equity leads to a rise in filed foreclosures of between
0.4 and 0.6 percent. In particular, they find that the effect depends on the length of the
payment problems. Furthermore, a one percent increase in the proportion of borrowers
with negative equity rises the number of foreclosures by 0.7 percent in the short run, with
and time varying long run effect.
In the UK, mortgage borrowers are responsible for their debt obligations for up to six
years after the lender has decided to foreclose the house (Aron and Muellbauer, 2010, p
10). In Norway, the condition is even stricter, as the debtor is permanently obliged to his
debt after a foreclosure, unless a debt settlement deal is granted.18 Thus, both in Norway
and in the UK, a borrower will seldom be better off by having his home foreclosed.
Still, negative equity seems to have strong explanatory power for foreclosures in the
UK. Households with negative equity may be constrained from selling their property or
refinancing the mortgage and are thus left with few other options than foreclosing on
the mortgage. Aron and Muellbauer (2010) also find a significant impact of policies that
shifts the forbearance policy of banks, where more forbearance generally lowers the rates
of foreclosures. Although it is highlighted as an important determinant, the impact of
housing prices in lenders willingness to adjust mortgages is not modeled.
3.2 Impact of shocks to income:
In general, the variability of income will affect borrowers’ ability to meet their periodic
mortgages installments, and hence affect the probability of a foreclosure. Foote et al
(2009) find a strong positive effect of unemployment on defaults for both prime and
subprime borrowers in their proportional hazard model.19 A one percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate is found to raise the hazard ratio of about 1.23 percent. A
similar result is found in Li and White (2009), although the point estimate is somewhat
18Tvangsfulbyrdelsesloven 1992: http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19920626-086.html Lov om gjeldsord-
ning 1992: http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19920717-099.html
19Surprisingly, both Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005) and Sherlund (2008) find a reduced probability
of default when unemployment increases. However, since they both are using aggregated numbers on
unemployment, they miss individual variation, which may explain this puzzling result.
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lower.
Berry, Dalton and Nelson (2009) argue that a large proportion of Australian house-
holds face troubles in maintaining their mortgage payments in case of illness, divorce or
unemployment. A similar impact of unemployment is found also for the UK, where Muell-
bauer and Cameron (1997) and Bo¨heim and Taylor (2000) document a strong negative
effect from unemployment based on regional and micro-evidence, respectively.
3.3 Impact of debt and lending standards:
In general, the literature separates the impact of debt into two variables; the loan-to-
value (LTV) and the debt-to-income (DTI)-ratio. Higher debt increases the likelihood
of negative equity for the borrower, which seems to be one of the major determinants of
foreclosures. An increase in household debt will also affect the cash flow constraint of
households’, since higher levels of debt relative to income increases the periodic amount
spent on serving the debt.
Foote et al (2009) estimate that a one percentage point increase in the DTI ratio
raises the probability of foreclosure by 1.05 percent for prime borrowers and 8.3 percent
for subprime borrowers in the US.
Aron and Muellbauer (2010) look at the impact of the debt service ratio (debt pay-
ments including interest as a share of income) in their equilibrium correction setup. They
find that a one percentage point rise in the debt service ratio increases the foreclosure rate
by almost two percent, while filed foreclosures increase by about 1.6 percent. Interest-
ingly, the long run effect of an increase in the debt service ratio is found to be significant
only in the periods 1985-1995, and 2005-2010. This suggest that, as the authors point
out, the debt service ratio only affects foreclosures to the extent that households are
bounded by a negative cash flow.
In the US, there exists a vast literature on the impact of lending standards on foreclo-
sures. Most studies find that borrowers with higher credit scores have a lower probability
of foreclosures, and that subprime mortgages have a much larger tendency of default
than prime mortgages (Sherlund, 2008; Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005 and Gerardi,
Shapiroo and Willen, 2007).
Thus, based on the results in the literature, there may well be different short and
long run effects of debt on filed and actual foreclosures. While increased household
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borrowing may temporarily reduce the cash flow constraint, it will increase the DTI
ratio, which contributes to making the households more vulnerable to negative income
shocks. Interestingly, Sherlund (2008), finds that mortgages with an interest-only-period
has a lower default probability during the teaser period compared to standard mortgage
contracts, but higher default rates afterwards. This interest-only-period should in theory
have the same impact as short term borrowing, and seems to support the notion of
possible asymmetric effects of increased debt.
In periods with high housing price expectations, households experience easier access to
credit (Anundsen and Jansen, 2011; Borgersen and Sommervoll, 2006). In such periods,
previously constrained households may be able to refinance their mortgage in order over-
come temporary payment problems that otherwise would lead to an actual foreclosure.
However, as their debt level increases they become more vulnerable to income shocks and
the likelihood that they will experience negative equity increases. In such a framework,
large increases in filed foreclosures relative to actual foreclosures may indicate that an
increasing number of households are reaching an unsustainable debt level, which easily is
turned into actual forecloses in the event of negative shocks to income or falling housing
prices.
3.4 Norwegian literature
The empirical literature on foreclosures in Norway is relatively scarce. That said, there
has been quite extensive research on debt serving capacity and recurring payment prob-
lems among Norwegian Households (Poppe, 2005; Vatne, 2006 and Guldbrandsen, 1999).
Astrup and Holm (2009) are the only authors that have investigated foreclosures in rela-
tion to macro-economic variables in Norway. Their analysis consists of a combination of
an aggregate time-series approach and micro-data evidence from a sample of Lindorff’s
data base.20 Surprisingly, the authors conclude that geography and housing prices do
not have a direct effect on foreclosures. However, this finding is based on the lack of a
connection between foreclosures and centrality, measured in five categories of population
densities and is not analyzed over time. A limitation of their analysis is that possible
effects of the loan-to-value ratio and changes in housing prices are not included in their
20Lindorff is a provider of debt-related administrative services, such as credit evaluation, invoicing,
reminders, and debt collection
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models.
Their research does however open for a role of housing prices in affecting banks will-
ingness to extend credit to otherwise constrained borrowers. Interestingly, they find that
the DTI ratio is relatively higher among individuals who experience a foreclosure, and
their measure of DTI is significant in the time series specification. Furthermore, it is
worth noting that those who experience a foreclosure are not different from the popula-
tion in regards to income, but they tend to be younger than the average borrower and
subject to a prior reduction in income.21
In an OLS regression on foreclosures, Astrup and Holm (2009) find a strong positive
effect from the unemployment rate, while the interest rate is found to be insignificant.
Their findings seem plausible as the interest rate tend to move countercyclically, and will
be low in times of high unemployment (Astrup and Holm, 2009, p 155). However, due
to data limitations, their results are based on only 18 observations from 1990 – 2008 and
does not account for housing prices.
21See Appendix B for a more thorough discussion on indivual charactaristics of those who experience
a foreclosure
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4 Institutional Framework
A creditor can file for a foreclosure if the debtor defaults on a debt that is secured by
collateral. However, if the debtor fails to meet his periodic payments on unsecured debt,
the creditor can file the court for a claim in any property the debtor may have. Hence, a
debtor that is unable to meet his periodic debt payments may have his property foreclosed
regardless of whether the debt was secured or not in the first place.22
In order to file for a foreclosure, the debtor must have defaulted on his periodic debt
payments. 23 Moreover, the bank must argue that several missed payments shows that the
debtor is unable to fulfill the original agreement. The debtor will then receive a warning
letter stating that his property will be filed for a foreclosure if he fails to pay within two
weeks upon receiving the letter. If the debtor still does not pay his debt installment, the
petition for the foreclosure will be filed to the court, which then considers whether the
property should be foreclosed or not.
Figure 3: Legal procedure
First, the court makes a preliminary trial of the petition to see whether the filed
foreclosure can be upheld. When the debtor has responded, or the deadline has expired,
the court decides whether the creditor can foreclose the property. An intermediary, a
22This section is based on the law on foreclosures (tvangsfulbyrdelsesloven 1992):
http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19920626-086.html, and the law on personal bankruptcies (lov om
gjeldsordning 1992) http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19920717-099.html in addition to information from
the court administration in Oslo.
23The following section concider the procedure when the creditor has secured his debt by a collateral
in debtors property
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Refinancing Voluntary sale Debt settlement Foreclosure
The debtor can reach If the value of the Can be granted The debtor’s property
a refinancing deal house is greater if the individual is is sold by an agent
with the bank, than the debt, considered permanently for the court
get a temporary the debtor can unable to repay his debt.
postponement of his sell his property In most cases, the debtor
debt payments or to pay the creditor is able to keep
take up short term his house
debt to pay his
mortgage installments
Property sold?
No Yes No Yes
Table 1: Possible outcomes after a filed foreclosure
lawyer or a real estate agent, usually facilitates the sale. This intermediary does in
many cases attempt to settle an agreement between the parties often involving either a
refinancing deal or a voluntary sale of the house (Astrup and Holm 2009). The creditor
and debtor are free to negotiate any agreement during the process. A bank may for
instance adjust the periodic installments or grant a refinancing deal, secured by the value
of any property the debtor may have.
Note that this process usually takes between 8 – 12 months, where in many cases
another solution than a foreclosure is found (Astrup and Holm 2009, p 48). Based on data
on filed and actual foreclosures, it is clear that roughly five percent of the filed foreclosures
end up as actual foreclosures (see Figure 1). Still, a large fraction of households are forced
to sell their house due to permanent income setbacks and subsequent failure to pay their
mortgage installments. However, in this situation, households have the option to sell
instead of having the property foreclosed by court. This de facto foreclosure will not
appear as a foreclosure in the data, which may bias the foreclosure data downwards. As
Astrup and Holm (2009, p 101) argue, it may only be a small practical difference between
these “voluntary sales” and the court registered foreclosures. Using data from Lindorff,
Astrup and Holm (2009) find that among those that received a filed foreclosure, there
were equally many “voluntary sales” as there were actual foreclosures. Thus, in a broad
sense, the actual foreclosure numbers are about twice the level they appear in the data.
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5 A simple model of foreclosures
In order to reach a more precise understanding of the factors determining the likelihood
and outcome of a filed foreclosure, a simple model of foreclosures is presented. The model
captures both the household’s ability to maintain the contract, through a household cash-
flow constraint, and the bank’s willingness to refinance in case of a breach of the contract.
I find that filed foreclosures are mainly affected by the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio,
while the occurrence of an actual foreclosures depends on a ”double trigger”. That is, an
actual foreclosure is realized only if a household experience an income setback and the
expected value of the collateral is too small for a refinancing deal to be preferable the
bank.
The model is consistent with the implications the model of Borgersen and Sommervoll
(2006), where housing price expectations determines the available credit for the house-
holds through their collateral. However, the model moves beyond this framework to
look more specifically at the interplay leading to a foreclosure. The theoretical frame-
work builds upon Foote et al. (2009), but is adjusted to fit the Norwegian institutional
framework. Furthermore, the households cash-flow condition is modeled explicitly. This
structure, I argue, shed more light on how filed and actual foreclosures are affected by
households’ ability pay in addition to the households’ and the banks’ willingness to uphold
the contract.
5.1 Timeline and model description
Consider a representative household that in period t = 0 seek a mortgage M0 from the
bank to buy a house at a price P0. The amount to be paid back during the duration of
the contract is given by L = (1 + r)M0, which is repaid in two installments: m1 = δM0
in period t = 1 and m2 = (1 + r)M0 − δM0 in period t = 2. Thus, we have that:
L = (1 + r)M0 = m1 +m2 (1)
The interest rate, r, is defined as the interest earned after the bank has discounted
the payment. Note that r is only paid on the period t = 2 installment. The contract
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Figure 4: Timing of events
is terminated in period t = 2, when the household sells his house and the final debt is
repaid.
In period t = 0, the bank chooses whether to grant the mortgage M0 for a purchase of
the house at value P0. The agent earns a gross income less some minimum consumption
of ys in period t = 1. The income, ys, is stochastic and is realized in period t = 1. The
income can take two values, and is given by:
ys =
yh = L with probability λyl = 0 with probability (1− λ)
 (2)
The high income, yh, is assumed to be sufficient to cover the entire mortgage payment
L, while the low income, yl ,is assumed to be 0 , i.e. realized income only covers some
minimum consumption level In order for the agent to uphold his mortgage agreement
in period t = 1, his net income cannot exceed the periodic mortgage installment m1.
Thus, in order to reach the contracted agreement, the agent needs to satisfy the following
cash-flow constraint.
ys ≥ m1 (3)
As the high income is sufficient to repay the entire mortgage, a realization of this income
16
level enables the agent to pay according to the contracted agreement. Thus, the high
income ensures that the household may chose to stay in the house and repay the total
amount, including interests, L, to the bank inperiod t = 2, or sell the house at a price
P1 in period t = 1. Since the income is sufficient to repay the mortgage, the household
holds the entire value of the house in period t = 2 if he chooses to stay in the house.
The low income is, however, only sufficient to cover the household’s minimum con-
sumption level, so that yl = 0 < m1. Thus, when the low income is realized the agent
will not be able to pay the periodic mortgage installment stipulated by the contract.
Consequently, when yl is realized the bank chooses in period t = 1 whether to foreclose
the property, or to offer a refinancing deal.
Figure 5 illustrates the five different outcomes of this model, which – as discussed
above -depends on the state of income and the choices of the household and the bank.
Figure 5: Structure of the game
1. No mortgage: The bank does not grant M0, which means that the household
receives the expected income, and the bank receives nothing.
2. Voluntary sale: The bank grants a mortgage M0 in period t = 0, the high income,
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yh, is realized, and the household chooses to sell the house at a value P1 in period
t = 1. The household receives P1 −M0 + yh, and the bank receives M0
3. Contract upheld: The bank grants a mortgage M0 in period t = 0, the high
income is realized and the contract is upheld. The household receives the P2 in
period t = 2 and the bank receives the contracted mortgage payment, L.
4. Refinance: The mortgage is granted in period t = 0, the low income is realized and
the household gets a refinancing deal by the bank in period t = 1. The household is
expected to make a mortgage payment M̂0 > M0 in period t = 2, which is backed
by the expected housing value at t = 2.
5. Foreclosure: The mortgage is granted in period t = 0, the low income is realized
and the house is foreclosed by the bank in period t = 1. The household receives the
remaining value of the house after paying the mortgage max[P1 −M0,0] , and the
bank receives M0, or the value of the house if selling the house does not provide
sufficient funds to repay the mortgage, min[P1,M0]
5.2 The household’s payoff for different outcomes
Contracted payment
The household seeks the bank for a mortgage M0 in period t = 0 in order to purchase
a house at a price P0. In period t = 1, the high income is realized and the household
chooses between staying in the house and commiting to the contract, or to sell the house
at a price P1. In period t = 1, sticking to the contracted payment gives the following
expected value for the household:
V Ch = E1(P2)− L+ yh = E1(P2) (4)
Voluntary sale
The household chooses to sell the house at a price P1 in period t = 1 and repay the
mortgage M0 to the bank. A voluntary sale gives the following payoff for the household
in period t = 1:
V Sh = P1 + y
h −M0 (5)
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Refinancing
Under refinancing, the net income is given by yl = 0. Consequently, the household is
unable to pay the mortgage installment in period t = 1 (the cash flow constraint fails to
be met). However, the household still owes the bank the mortgage M0. For the bank to be
willing to offer a refinancing deal the household must agree to repay M̂0 = (1+r)M0 > M0
in period t = 2, which is collateralized by the period t = 1 expected housing value in
period t = 2:
V Rh = max[E1(P2)− M̂0, 0] (6)
M̂0 = (1 + r)M0 where r > 0. (7)
The condition in (7) is necessary to ensure that the bank strictly prefers a refinancing
deal to a foreclosure when the household has positive equity. The assumption entails that
the bank must earn a positive interest, r on the mortgage in order to be willing to take
the risk of offering a refinancing deal.
Foreclosure
If the low income state is realized, and the bank chooses to foreclose the house, the
household receives the difference between the housing value and the mortgage, P1 −M0,
as long as the housing value exceeds M0. The household receives 0 otherwise. That is,
the household is in this model only obliged to a mortgage that is covered by the housing
value (limited liability).24 Let V Fh denote the household’s utility from a foreclosure. We
then have
V Fh = max(P1 −M0, 0) (8)
5.3 The household’s decision to stay or sell
In period t = 1, the income is realized. The realization of the high income state, allows
the household to choose whether it wants to stay in the house and pay according to the
24This condition is somewhat laxer than in reality. In Norway the debtor is obliged to his entire
mortgage even after a foreclosure. However, it may take long time before the bank receives the remaining
debt. Furthermore, the debtor has the opportunity to seek a debt settlement in which the remaining
debt is written off over a five year period
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contract, or to sell the house. In order for the household to be willing to stay in the house
in period t = 1, the value of upholding the contract must exceed the value of selling the
house in period t = 1. That is:
V Ch > V
S
h ⇔ E1(P2)− L+ yh > P1 + yh −M0
E1(P2)− P1 > rM0 (9)
From (9) we see that the household will stay in the house until period t = 2 and commit
to the contract if the expected housing price appreciation from period t = 1 to period
t = 2 exceeds the interest paid on the mortgage over that period.
5.4 The bank’s payoff
The bank decides in period t = 0 whether to grant the loan or not. If the loan is granted,
the bank receives the contracted payment L if in period t = 1 the high income state is
realized and the household chooses to uphold the contract. In the case were the household
decides to sell the house in period t = 1 the bank receives M0. If the low income state
is realized, the bank chooses in period t = 1 between offering a refinancing deal or to
foreclose the property.
Refinance
In period t = 1 the bank can choose to offer a refinancing deal to the household instead
of foreclosing the house when ys = yl. Even though the household cannot promise to
repay the mortgage based on his income (which is zero), part of the value of the house in
period t = 2 can be used to repay the bank in that period. Hence, it is possible for the
bank to offer a refinancing deal from which it gains relative to a foreclosure. By choosing
refinancing, the bank requires a payment M̂0 = (1 + r)M0. However, if the housing value
in period t = 2 falls short of this payment, the bank will only receive the period t = 2
housing value P2. In expectations, the value for the bank of a refinancing deal can be
written as:
V Rb = min[E1(P2), M̂0] (10)
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Foreclosure
We assumed that the household’s income is zero after covering a minimum level of
consumption, that is when ys = yl. Thus, when foreclosing the house, the bank gets the
entire mortgage M0 from the period t = 1 housing value P1. In the case where the value
of the house is not sufficient to cover M0 (M0 > P1), the bank can only claim the value
of the house, P1. With these assumptions, the bank will only get the full principal of the
mortgage back from a foreclosure if the housing value is at least as great as the mortgage,
i.e. when the borrower has positive equity. This means that the banks payoff function
under a foreclosure can be written as:
V Fb = min[M0, P1] (11)
5.5 The bank’s decision to file for a foreclosure
When the low income state occurs, the household fails to meet his periodic debt in-
stallment, and the bank can file for a foreclosure. I assume that the bank will file for
a foreclosure regardless of whether it ends up offering a refinancing deal or chooses to
foreclose.25 Thus, when the cash-flow condition (3) is violated, the bank files for a fore-
closure. By substituting for m1 = δM0 in (3), we see that if y
s < δM0, the bank files for
a foreclosure, which obviously will be the case when yl = 0. In a more general setting, it
is reasonable to assume that the income is drawn from a continuous distribution on the
interval [yl, yh]. In that case, the installment m1 = δM0, determines the likelihood of a
filed foreclosure for a given realization of household income. Consequently, filed foreclo-
sures can be seen as a function of the household debt relative to household income and
how ”frontloaded” the mortgage is. Theoretically, we would therefore expect that filed
foreclosures are determined by a function of the following form, where y is some income
realization on the interval [yl, yh]:
Filed(
−
y,
+
M0,
+
δ) (12)
25This assumption may be reasonable as the file for a foreclosure in reality helps the bank to reveal the
household’s true state of income. This possibility limits any problems of assymetric information between
household and bank in the event of debt default
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5.6 The bank’s decision to refinance
In order for the bank to prefer a refinancing deal to a foreclosure, it must in t = 1 expect
to receive more from a refinancing deal than a foreclosure, i.e. V Rb > V
F
b . This will
depend on whether the housing value in period t = 1 exceeds the outstanding mortgage
(P1 > M0), or whether the housing value in period t = 1 falls short of the outstanding
mortgage (P1 < M0). In the following, the first case is referred to as the household having
positive equity (Pe) and the second case as negative equity (Ne). Assume that the value
of P1 is known to the bank when it makes its decision.
In the case of positive equity in period t = 1, the bank chooses between receiving the
full principal M0 immediately, or receiving the payment min[E1(P2), M̂0] in period t = 2.
.
Case 1
V Rb > V
F
b if min[E1(P2), M̂0] > M0. As, V
R
b is a non-decreasing function of E1(P2) the
condition can be written as E1(P2) > M0.
The period t = 1 expected housing value for period t = 2 must exceed the mortgage value
in order for the bank to offer a refinancing deal. That is, the bank will never be willing
to refinance if it expects that the household has negative equity in the next period.
Case 2
V Rb > V
F
b if min[E1(P2), M̂0] > P1 ⇒ E1(P2) > P1.
In this case, the period t = 1 expected housing value for period t = 2 must exceed the
housing value in period t = 1. Thus, the bank must expect a housing price appreciation,
in order to be willing to offer a refinancing deal when the household has negative equity.
We see that the bank is more willing to offer a refinancing deal when the household
has negative equity. This is because the bank has a smaller alternative cost when the
equity is negative. That is, the bank receives a smaller payoff from a foreclosure when
the household has negative equity. For that reason, a smaller payoff in the period t = 2
is required for the refinancing deal to be profitable for the bank ex ante. Note, however,
that a household experiencing negative equity will obtain a refinancing deal only when
the bank expects housing prices to appreciate. The bank’s decision to refinance can be
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written in the following way:
Refinance = V Rb − V Fb = min[E1(P2), M̂0]−min[M0, P1] (13)
,which suggests that the decision to refinance can be summarized by the following func-
tion:
Refinance[
−
M0,
−
P1,
+
E1(P2)] (14)
An expected housing price inflation, increases the banks willingness to offer a refinancing
deal, while a higher initial mortgage, M0, and period t = 1 housing price, P1, reduces its
willingness to do so.
Figure 6: Decision to refinance
This is illustrated in Figure 6, which draws V Rb and V
F
b as functions of the expected
housing price in period t = 2. To the right of point A, i.e. for E1(P2) > E1(P2), the
banks payoff from refinance is higher than the pay-off from a foreclosure regardless of
whether equity is positive or negative. Thus a refinance deal is preferable. Below that
point, E1(P2) ≤ E1(P2), the bank chooses to foreclose the house when equity is positive.
We see that a in the event of negative equity, the line indicating the value of a foreclosure
shifts down, and the intercept is moved to B. This increases the area in which the bank
chooses refinancing as marked by the dotted brackets
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5.7 Determinants of filed and actual foreclosures
The model presented in the previous sections establishes a conceptual framework for the
expected determinants of the number of filed foreclosures, and under what conditions a
filed foreclosure is realized as an actual foreclosures. As seen in the previous discussion,
a filed foreclosure will happen when the household’s income falls short of the contracted
mortgage installment. Thus, the number of filed foreclosures can be written as a function
(12), depending on the level of household debt and the level of household income. In
practice, this means that factors such as unemployment, household income, the interest
rate and household debt affects the numbers of filed foreclosures at an aggregate level,
while housing prices should play a lesser role. Note that in reality, households may seek
additional lending from other sources before the bank files for a foreclosure. Whether a
household is able to obtain such a loan will depend on the expected housing value (confer
the discussion in Section 5.6).
Thus, expected housing prices may have an influence on filed foreclosures even though
it is not directly incorporated into the model section.
A filed foreclosure will only be realized as an actual foreclosure if the bank is unwilling
to refinance the mortgage. Thus the number of actual foreclosures can be written as an
equation:
Foreclosures = Filed(y,M0)− Refinance(
−
M0,
−
P1,
+
E1(P2)) (15)
The number of actual foreclosures depends on the number of filed foreclosures, in ad-
dition to the variables determining the bank’s willingness to offer a refinancing deal. The
willingness to extend a refinance deal should therefore depend on the expected housing
prices and the size of the household’s debt.
According to the model, a household facing a negative income shock can borrow on
its house to overcome the setback, and thus avoid a foreclosure. However this possibility
is reduced the higher is the value of their total debt. The larger their debt becomes, the
more dependent are the households on positive housing price expectations in order to
avoid a foreclosure.
From that perspective, it is possible to understand how large increases in filed fore-
closures can happen without causing large increases in actual foreclosures. When the
household debt burden increases, more people will fail to meet their periodic debt in-
stallments, and the number of filed foreclosures will, ceteris paribus, increase. However,
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as long as the lenders expect housing prices to increase, they may be willing to offer a
refinancing deal in order to obtain value from the housing price increase. In the situation
of large increases in filed foreclosures, the sustainability of the households’ debt burden
is crucially dependent on expectations of higher housing prices.
Finally, two additional important points are worth emphasizing. First, both the will-
ingness to refinance and the willingness to grant mortgages depend on expected housing
prices (See Appendix C). Thus, large increases in foreclosures would tend to coincide
with low demand of housing among credit constrained households. Second, the house-
holds willingness to stay in the house depends on the expected housing price appreciation
relative to the cost of the mortgage. That is, in the case of falling housing price expecta-
tions, a larger number of voluntary sales among the ”high income group” would coincide
with an increased number of foreclosures.
6 Data and methodology
The analysis in this thesis builds on a new data set gathered by the author on filed and
actual foreclosures spanning the period 1980 -2011 for the 19 Norwegian counties. The
new data set allows me to expand the analysis of Astrup and Holm (2009). First, the
data set has a larger number of observations due to the panel structure. Hence, the
impact of time-varying macroeconomic factors on foreclosures may be more rigorously
assessed. More explanatory variables are included, such as housing prices and debt, and
the econometric models are specified in order to capture any differences between short
and long run effects. Second, the data set allows for an analysis of both the developments
in actual foreclosures and in filed foreclosures. This is particularly important as increases
in filed foreclosures tend to lead the increases in actual foreclosures.
A description of the data set and the characteristics of those who have their homes
foreclosed are given in the Appendix A. This section begins by looking at the long run
developments in the data-series and proceeds to describe the empirical methodology used
in this thesis.
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6.1 Trends in filed and actual foreclosures:
From 2006 to 2011, the number of filed foreclosures increased by more than 60 percent
at the national level. As can be seen from Figure 7, the increase in filed and actual
foreclosures is apparent also when controlling for banks’ total loans to households. That
is, the increase in filed and actual foreclosures cannot solely be attributed to the increased
volume of loans in itself.
Figure 7: Filed and actual foreclosures as a share of real total lending
The number of filed and actual foreclosurs per million kroner lent, adjusted for inflation. Total lending
includes lending from banks, mortgage companies and finance companies
The numbers show that a relative small fraction of the filed foreclosures has ended
up as actual foreclosures in recent years, while about 15 percent of the filed foreclosures
were realized during the banking crisis of 1988-1993. These numbers are surprisingly low,
and suggest that many debtors prefer a voluntary solution to their debt problems rather
than having their house foreclosed. Yet, as Astrup and Holm (2009) point out, many
households avoid a foreclosure by selling their house outside the court, even though this
sale is made necessary due to defaulted debt.
Regional variation:
There are considerable regional variations in the growth in filed foreclosures from 2006 –
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2011, with some regions having experienced more than a doubling in the number of filed
foreclosures over the six year period between 2006 and 2011. From Figure 9, it is evident
that the level of filed foreclosures per capita is closely correlated with the unemployment
rate. That said, over the period 2006-2011 the unemployment rate has in general fallen,
while the numbers of filed foreclosures has continued to increase. Thus, the level of unem-
ployment cannot by itself explain the variation over time in filed foreclosures. Moreover,
from 2006 – 2011, the unemployment averaged at 2.5 percent and the nominal interest
rate has averaged at 3 percent 26. Thus, given the relatively favorable macroeconomic
situation, the developments in the foreclosure numbers are surprising.
Figure 8: Regional growth in filed foreclosures
Figure 9: Filed foreclosures and the unemployment rate
26The nominal interest rate refers to the slight deposit rate (key policy rate), source: Statistics Norway
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Foreclosures as an indicator of debt-vulnerability?:
In my view, lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 1980s suggest that
the number of filed and actual foreclosures serve as good indicators of economic distress
among Norwegian households. From Figure 7, we see that the number of filed and actual
foreclosures increased in the late 1980s. In 1987 real housing prices fell while real after-tax
interest rates and unemployment rose substantially during the business cycle downturn
(Steigum 2004).
Before the crisis, households’ debt-to-income ratio reached a level of more than 160
percent, which according to several authors proved unsustainable as the business cycle
turned.27 The number of foreclosures per krone lent (adjusted for inflation) increased
with an astonishingly 75 percent over the period 1986-1989. At the peak in 1989, about
7 foreclosures were filed per million krone lent. The number of actual foreclosures tripled
from 1986 – 1989, where more than 3000 houses were foreclosed annually until 1993. Thus,
in a historical perspective, it seems likely that a large increase in foreclosures reflects a
growing debt-vulnerability among the households.
Figure 10: The number of execution procedures
12 month moving average (centered) in the development in creditor’s demands on debtor’s property
caused by defaulted debt. Source: Statistics Norway
The recent increase in filed foreclosures can also be seen in relation to the number of
registered execution procedures. These execution procedures reveal the number of cases
27For the recent data on household debt to disposable income ratio see Jurgilas and Lansing (2012).
Both Schwierz (2004, p 122-124) and Gerdrup (2004) holds this notion. See also the Smith commissions
report to the parliament (1998).
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where a creditor makes a claim on any property the debtors may have, both real estate
and other. Such procedures are taken out on loans without security, such as credit card
loans or consumer loans after the debtor has failed to meet his periodical payments.
Figure 10 reveals a more than a 100 percent increase in these numbers from late 2008.
Thus, it appears that an increasing number of households are unable or unwilling to
maintain their short term debt burden.
Secondly, there seems to be a close connection between filed foreclosures in Norway
and households’ ability to pay their bills. Figure 11 plots filed foreclosures as a share of
total lending on the right axis, and SIFOs measure of recurrent payment problems on
the left axis. 28 We see that these two variables reveal the same trend the last six years,
which indicates that the increase in filed foreclosure reflects reduced ability to pay among
households.
Figure 11: Filed foreclosures and the share of households with recurring payment prob-
lems
Recurrent payment problems measures the share of households stating that they have sometimes or
often been unable to pay their bills, interest payments or mortgage installments the last year. See
Poppe(2011)
28SIFO - Statens institutt for forbruksforskning
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Foreclosures and the housing market:
Figure 12 indicates a negative correlation between real housing prices and actual foreclo-
sures, as is found in many other countries (See Section 3). Falling housing prices seem
to be followed by increases in actual foreclosures. The negative connection does not only
hold in the time dimension. As can be seen from Figure 13, the regions with the highest
housing prices in 2011, are also the regions with the lowest rates of foreclosures per capita.
Figure 12: Number of actual foreclosures and real housing prices
Figure 13: Actual foreclosures and housing prices 2011
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Summary:
Lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis of the early 1990s suggest that filed foreclo-
sures may serve as a good indicator of debt-vulnerability among Norwegian households.
Such an interpretation is supported by the conspicious correlation between filed foreclo-
sures, recurrent payment problems and registered execution procedures. Actual and filed
foreclosures seem to be related to the business cycle and especially the housing market.
Yet, neither the developments in unemployment nor the interest rates appear to be able
to fully explain the recent period of increase in filed and actual foreclosures. Finally,
the increase in filed foreclosures has not been followed by an equal increase in actual
foreclosures.
From the data-plots above, preliminary conclusions can be drawn that suggest inter-
esting hypotheses that may be confronted with the data more formally. First, I ask to
what extent the recent increase in filed foreclosures is driven by the increase in household
debt burden. Second, I ask why so few filed foreclosures end up in actual foreclosures,
and whether part of this may be attributed to the recent years’ growth in housing prices?
6.2 Methodology
Stationarity and non-stationarity
The assumptions of the classical regression model requires that the disturbances of the
model follows a stationary process. The term stationarity usually refers to the concept
of weak stationarity, or covariance stationarity, where the variable’s first two moments
and its auto-covariance are time invariant (Enders 2004, p 53). For a variable yt, these
requirements may formally be expressed as:
1. E(yt) = E(yt−s) = µ ∀s
2. V ar(yt) = V ar(yt−s) = σ2y ∀s
3. Cov(yt, yt−s) = cov(yt−j, yt−j−s) = γs ∀s
Consequently, if the first two moments, or the auto-covariance is time-dependent,.the
variable is said to be non-stationary. As shown by Granger and Newbold (1974), two
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variables that are non-stationary, and do not share a common stochastic trend, may
yield a spurious relationship that appears significant, but is without economic meaning.
Furthermore, the variance of a non-stationary series is time-dependent, causing the usual
hypothesis tests, such as t-test, F-test and R2 to be invalid (Enders 2004, p 171). To see
this, consider the following example:
Let xt follow an AR(1) process:
xt = ρxt−1 + et where et v iid N(0, σ2)
Solving this recursively
xt = ρ
2xt−2 + ρet−1 + et
xt = ρ
3xt−3 + ρ2et−2 + ρet−1 + et
xt = ρ
kxt−k +
k−1∑
j=0
ρjet−j (16)
Assume that −1 < ρ < 1 and let k →∞ :
xt =
∞∑
j=0
ρjet−j
E(xt) = 0
var(xt) = var(
∞∑
j=0
ρjet−j) =
∞∑
j=0
ρ2jvar(et−j) =
σ2
1− ρ2
We see that both the mean and the variance are time independent as k approaches
infinity. When ρ < |1|, x is thus said to be stationary
Let instead xt be a random walk and assume that the initial value x0 is given, we
have:
xt = x0 +
k−1∑
j=0
et−j
E(xt) = x0
var(xt) = var(
k−1∑
j=0
et−j) =
k−1∑
j=0
var(et−j) = kσ2
We see that the variance of xt increases over time and in fact approaches infinity, as
k → ∞. When xt follows a random walk, it is said to contain a unit root. Thus, in the
presence of a unit root, the series is non-stationarity and does not have a finite variance.
Order of integration
A non-stationary variable is said to be integrated of order one, I(1), if differencing it once
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leads to a stationary process. We see that even though xt is non-stationary series when
ρ = 1, it becomes stationary after taking the first difference:
∆xt = xt − xt−1 = et
E(∆xt) = 0
var(∆xt) = var(et) = σ
2
The concept of integratedness can be extended to the general case: A time series is said
to be integrated of order d if (1−L)dXt is integrated of order 0. Here, L is a lag operator,
so that (1− L)Xt = Xt −Xt−1 = ∆X. Consequently, the order of integration, I(d),of a
time series refers to the minimum number times the series must be differenced to obtain
a stationary series. A series that is stationary is referred to as I(0), i.e. it is stationary
without differencing.
Cointegration
For ordinary least squares to give meaningful results, it is essential that the equation
under consideration is balanced (Granger, 1990). A balanced equation requires that the
variable we seek to explain has the same time series properties as the variables we use to
explain that variable with. With reference to equation (18) below, we say that the model
is balanced if yt and xt have the same order of integration.
Since any linear combination of two stationary variables is also stationary, we know
that the disturbance in (18) will be I(0) if both xt and yt are I(0), which is necessary for
OLS to satisfy the Gauss-Markov theorem. In the case where yt is I(0)(I(1)) and xt is
I(1)(I(0)), (18) will not represent a balanced equation, and OLS breaks down.
Finally, when both xt and yt are I(1),(18) is a balanced equation. That said, the
disturbance will in general be I(1), since in most cases a linear combination of a set of
I(1) variables will be I(1) as well. In that case, OLS would not produce estimators that
satisfy the BLUE property. That said, even if a set of variables are non-stationary, for
instance I(1), a linear combination of these variables may be stationary. In that case, the
variables are said to be cointegrated. When a set of variables are cointegrated, they are
said to share a common stochastic trend, which means that they will never drift ”too”
far apart. Another way to think about this is that cointegration implies that a long-run
relationship between the variables exists, so that any deviation from this relationship is
temporary. With reference to equation (18), if xt and yt are both I(1), but cointegrated,
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we know that the disturbance is I(0), and hence that OLS will give estimators that are
BLUE. Formally, following the definition of Engle and Granger (1987) definition, a vector
of variables, xt, are said to be cointegrated of order (d, b), denoted xt ∼ CI(d, b) if
1. All components of xt are integrated of order d
2. There exists a vector β = (β1, β2...βn) such that the linear combination βxt =
β1x1t + β2x2t + ..βnxnt is integrated of order (d− b) where b > 0
To see what this definition means, consider the following autoregressive distributed
lag (ARDL) model as an example:
yt = a0 + b0xt + b1xt−1 + a1yt−1 + et (17)
Assume that both yt and xt are I(1) variables. Yet, a linear combination of the variables
form a cointegrated relationship, as specified below.
yt = β0 + β1xt + ut (18)
Since yt and xt are cointegrated, yt−β0−β1xt = ut is by definition integrated of order
zero, I(0). Thus, the system is in equilibrium whenever yt−β0−β1xt = 0. The deviation
from the long run equilibrium -called the equilibrium error - can be represented by the
error term ut,
Equilibrium correction representation
A main feature of a cointegrating relationship is that the time paths of the variables
are affected by the deviation from the long run relationship. This feature allows for the
cointegrated relationship to be represented as an equilibrium correction model (ECM)
(Engle and Granger,1987). This representation captures how the short run dynamics
of the variables are affected by any deviation from the long run equilibrium (Enders
2004. p 328-329). As the model in Section 5 is concerned with the number of filed and
actual foreclosure in equilibrium, such a representation is fortunate. The ECM allows
for estimation of both the long run equilibrium condition and the impact of short run
changes in the variables.
To see how the ECM can be derived, let the ARDL model in (17) form the starting
point. Now, by adding and subtracting yt−1 and b0xt−1, the equation can be rewritten in
the following way
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∆yt = a0 + b0∆xt − (1− a1)yt−1 + (b0 + b1)xt−1 + et (19)
∆yt = a0 + λ(yt−1 − β1xt−1) + b0∆xt + et (20)
Where β1 =
(b0+b1)
1−a1 λ = −(1− a1).
The term yt − β0 − β1xt = ut is the cointegrated relationship which by definition is
stationary. Define the system’s ”steady state” by setting y∗ = yt = yt−1 and x∗ = xt =
xt−1. Then the ECM may be re-expressed in the following way
∆yt = µ+ λ(yt−1 − y∗) + b0∆xt + et (21)
With µ = a0 + λβ0 and y
∗ = β0 + β1x∗
Now, we see that the parameter λ , called the speed of adjustment parameter, denotes
how ∆yt is affected by disequilibrium constellations. If the system is temporary above
its long run equilibrium, so that yt−1 > y∗ , λ will bring the variable towards equilibrium
by lowering ∆yt. Consequently, in order for the system to return to equilibrium, λ < 0.
Note that if the system did not return to equilibrium, there would be no conintegrating
relationship, as the variables could wander arbitrarily far from each other. The Engle-
Granger representation theorem states that the restrictions necessary to ensure that the
variables are CI(1, 1) guarantee that an equilibrium-correction model exists. Thus coin-
tegration implies equilibrium correction, and equilibrium correction implies cointegration
Testing for non-stationarity
In the previous section, I described the importance of determining whether a variable is
stationary or not. In order to test whether the variables in the data set are stationary, I
use the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test for panel unit roots. The test regression is specified
as follows:
∆yit = ai0 + γiyi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
δij∆yi,t−j + εit, where
i = 1, .., .N
t = 1, ..., T
(22)
The test parameter γi is used to test the null hypothesis that all cross-sections contains
a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that some cross-sections are stationary:
H0 : γ1 = γ2 = γ2.... = γN = 0
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H1 : γi < 0 for at least one i
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Estimating (22) for i = 1, ..., N an average t-statistic t = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 ti may be calcu-
lated. This test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity against the
alternative that the variable for at least one of units in the panel is stationary. Since, the
null hypothesis of the test is that the series contain a unit root, the t-bar cannot be eval-
uated against critical values form the standard t-distribution. This is because under the
null of non-stationarity, the test statistics follows a non-standard distribution. Instead,
the t-bar is evaluated against Im-Pesaran-Shins (2003) finite sample critical values. The
advantage of this test is that it allows for heterogeneity in the unit root parameter γi.
For the test to be valid, the error terms must be serially uncorrelated and contempora-
neously uncorrelated. However, the different regions are likely to be affected by common
shocks, so that the residuals from the equation in each panel may be contemporaneously
correlated, i.e. E(εit, εjt) 6= 0. In order to alleviate this problem, a common time effect is
subtracted from each observation yt = (1/n)
n∑
i=1
yit.
30 Another drawback of the IPS-test
is that the alternative hypothesis is that at least on unit in the panel is stationary. Hence
in some regions yit v I(1) while others are I(0). A rejection of the null hypothesis is
thus possible even though several of the panels contains a unit root. To accommodate
this problem, I also include the Breitung test for panel unit roots.
This test assumes a common autoregressive parameter for each panel. The test has
the null hypothesis of all panels containing a unit root against the alternative hypothesis
that all panels are stationary. The test uses the augmented Dikey-Fuller (ADF) test
regression as a starting point for each cross-sectional unit in the panel.31
∆yit = ρyi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
δj∆yi,t−j + εit (23)
Two auxiliary regressions are performed:
1. ∆yit on ∆yit−L and obtain the residuals ε̂it
29A unit root exist if a1 = 1 in the equation yt = a1yt−1 + t. This equation can be written as
∆yt = γyt−1 + t where γ = a1 − 1. Hence, testing whether a1 = 1 is equivalent to testing the null
hypothesis γ = 0
30Unfortunately, this correction may not eliminate the entire correlation and moreover, it is possible
that yt is non-stationary (Enders 228)
31See Breitung and Das (2005)
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2. yit−1 on ∆yit−L to get the residuals v̂i,t−1
Then a forward orthogonalization transformation is applied to the residuals ε̂it to
obtain e∗it. Finally, a pooled regression e
∗
it = ρv
∗
it−1+u
∗
it is estimated, which asymptotically
follows a standard normal distribution. The parameter ρ is used to test the null hypothesis
that all cross-sections contain a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that all
variables are stationary: 32
H0 : ρ = 0
H1 : ρ < 0
The tests for panel unit root is performed on the variables both in levels and changes
in order to evaluate their order of integration.
Testing for cointegration
After having determined the variables’ order of integration, it is possible to test whether
the variables with the same order of integration are cointegrated. A simple two-step
test can be performed to see whether a set of variables have a cointegrating relationship
(Engle and Granger 1987), i.e. that they share a common stochastic trend. Consider the
following equation:
yit = β1xit + uit (24)
where xit, yit v I(0) .Then for yit and xit to be cointegrated, uit must be I(0). The two
step test can be described in the following way:
1. From an OLS regression on (24), obtain the estimates of the errors uˆit = yit− β̂1xit.
2. Test whether uˆit contains a unit root by using a panel unit root test. If the null
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected, we conclude that yit and xit are cointegrated.
Finally, it is possible to test whether the specified model actually corrects towards
a long run equilibrium. Since equilibrium correction implies cointegration, this can be
used as additional evidence supporting or rejecting cointegration. For yit and xit to be
cointegrating, we know from the E-G representation theorem that the parameter λ in
32The test statistics used in this thesis allows for cross-sectional correlation among the error-terms
(Source http://homepage.univie.ac.at/robert.kunst/pan2011 pres nell.pdf, Breitung and Das 2005).
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equation (25) must be significantly negative. Note, however, that the estimate of λ does
not follow a t-distribution since under the null of no cointegration,yit−β0−β1xit is I(1).
∆yit = a0 + λ(yi,t−1 − β0 − β1xi,t−1) + b0∆xit + eit (25)
The application of cointegration test on a panel of cross-section has the advantage of
increasing the statistical power of the test. In addition, the panel structure allows for
more variability and efficiency than examining each cross-sectional unit separately (Levin,
Lin and Chu 2002). However, the panel structure also imposes additional complications.
First, the cross-sectional unit may not be contemporaneously uncorrelated. Second, the
cointegrating relationship may be cross-section specific, so that assuming homogenous
cointegration becomes misleading (Breitung and Pesaran 2005). Consider the following
regression equation where αi denotes region fixed effects:
yit = αi + β1ixit + uit (26)
xit = µ+ xi,t−1 + vit (27)
uit = ρiui,t−1 + eit (28)
Now if ρi < 1 for all i, errors are stationary and cointegration is implied. If β1i = β1
the cointegrating relationship is homogenous across regions and the results are valid from
panel cointegration. However, if there is heterogeneous cointegration, but we impose
homogeneity, the composite error term will in general not be stationary. Consider the
following model:
yit = αi + β1xit + [(β1i − β1)xi,t + eit] (29)
The term in brackets shows the composite error from the regression. While eit is station-
ary, the term (βi−β1)xi,t may be non-stationary. In order to test whether the results are
robust to panel heterogeneity, I use a simplified version of the Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(1999) model. The model accounts for heterogeneity across the regions by allowing the
speed of adjustment parameter αi to differ across regions while a common long-run re-
lationship (βi is common for all regions) is imposed between the variables. Eberhardt
(2011) argues that the estimators is appealing when studying small sets of arguably ”sim-
ilar” countries rather than large diverse macro panels. The estimation is specified in the
following way:
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∆yit = a0 + λi(yi,t−1 − β̂1xi,t−1) + b0∆xit + eit (30)
Estimating the ECM:
In order to estimate the equilibrium correction model a simple two-step procedure fol-
lowing Engle and Granger (1987) are performed.
1. Run a regression of yit on xit and save the residuals save the residuals ûi,t = yit−β̂1xit
2. Run error-correction regression of ∆yit on the estimated residuals ûi,t and on ∆xit
∆yit = a0 + λûi,t−1 + b0∆xit + eit (31)
Finally, in order to remove the unobserved fixed effects (that may be correlated with
the dependent variables), the variables in the regression are time-demeaned 33
∆y˜it = λûi,t−1 + b0∆x˜it + e˜it (32)
33Applying a fixed effects panel estimation, the time mean for each cross-sectional unit is subtracted
on both sides on the equation so that the region fixed effects are controlled for
y˜it = yit − 1T
∑T
i=0 yit
The time demeaning is applied both to the cointegrating relationship and the ECM. Note that this
procedure only removes time-invariant fixed effects that may be correlated with the regressors. If there
are region specific effects that are not constant over time and correlated with both the independent
variables and the regressors, there would still be a problem of omitted variable bias.
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7 Econometric results
This section seeks to empirically test the hypotheses of the previous sections:
1. To what extent is the recent increase in filed foreclosures driven by the increase in
debt burden of Norwegian households?
2. Why are so few filed foreclosures materialized as actual foreclosures? Can this be
attributed to recent years housing price growth?
In order to answer these questions, I specify an empirical model for filed an actual fore-
closures on the panel data set gathered for this thesis. Due to evidence of non-stationarity
in filed and actual foreclosures, I test for cointegration before I develop dynamic models
to investigate the short run determinantes of these variables.
7.1 Testing for unit root
To test the order of integration of the variables included in the analysis, I make use of
both the IPS-test and the Breitung test. The tests are conducted for the variables both
in levels and in first differences. For the levels, I include a constant and a deterministic
trend in the test regressions. Consistent with this, only a constant is included when
testing the variables in first differences. Results are reported in Table 2 and Table 3.
The IPS-test shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are
non-stationary, except for the case of the log of housing prices. For housing prices,
the IPS-test rejects that all cross-sectional units contain a unit root at a five percent
significance level. However, even if some cross-sectional units are stationary, it does not
ensure that housing prices are stationary, as several panels may contain a unit root.
The Breitung-test strongly indicates that housing prices contain a unit root, which is
consistent the existing empirical literature on housing prices (Anundsen and Jansen,
2011). When looking at the variables in first differences, however, both test rejects the
null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables. Thus, it is assumed that all variables in
this data-set are integrated of order one, though there are some minor signs of I(2) in
houshold debt.
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Panel unit root test - IPS: 1995-2010
Levels First differences
Variable Statistic p-values Statistic p-values
d 2.31 0.98 -1.15 0.12
i 1.75 0.96 -5.37 *** 0.00
DTI 0.85 0.80 -4.21 ** 0.00
hprice -1.99 ** 0.02 -3.60 *** 0.00
unemp -0.74 0.21 -4.03 *** 0.00
ff -0.03 0.48 -5.06 *** 0.00
af -1.15 0.12 -8.59 *** 0.00
H0 : All panels contain unit root
H1 : Some panels are stationary
Table 2: IPS-test
The IPS test allows for heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficients and uses one lag for each
variable. The lag length chosen is the same as in the Breitung test in order for the tests to be
comparable. The Breitung test requires more time periods net of lags than cross-sectional units. This
limits the lag length to one in the Breitung test. When testing in levels, a trend and a constant is
included. For the first differences only a constant term is included in order for consistency. Lower case
letters indicate logs see Table 4 for a description of the variables. *,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10 percent
significant level respectively
Panel unit root test - Breitung: 1995-2010
Levels First differences
Variable Statistic p-values Statistic p-values
d 0.64 0.74 -1.59 ** 0.06
i 0.91 0.82 -2.75 *** 0.00
DTI -0.45 0.32 -2.45 *** 0.01
hprice -0.28 0.39 -2.79 *** 0.00
unemp -0.58 0.22 -2.24 ** 0.04
ff -0.57 0.28 -3.73 *** 0.00
af -0.49 0.69 -4.63 *** 0.00
H0 : All panels contain unit root
H1 : Some panels are stationary
Table 3: Breitung-test
The Breitung test uses one lag for each variable in order control for autocorrelation in the error-term.
The robust version of the Breitung test requires more time periods net of lags than cross-sectional
units. This limits the lag length to one. Furthermore a deterministic trend and a constant is included.
For the first differences, only a constant term is included. The test-statistic is robust to cross-sectional
correlation in the error-term (Breitung 2005). All lower case letters indicate logs see Table 4. *,**,***
dentotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level respectively
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List of symbols
Variable Symbol Description
Actual foreclosures af The regional number of actual foreclosures per 1000
capita in logs
Debt d The level of average real household debt within in a
region measured in logs
Debt-to-income DTI The debt to income ratio: log(debt)-log(income)
Filed foreclosures ff The regional number of filed foreclosures per capita in
logs
Housing price hprice The regional housing price (kroner per m2) for an av-
erage house of 100 m2 measured in logs adjusted for
inflation
Income i The level of average real household income within a re-
gion measured in logs
Interest rate R Banks average lending rate
Unemployment unemp The regional unemployment rate measured in logs
Table 4: List of symbols
7.2 Estimating filed foreclosures
Cointegrating relationship
The number of filed foreclosures is assumed to be determined by (12) in Section 5 . Hence,
the number filed foreclosures is modeled as a function of housing prices, households’ debt-
to-income ratio (DTI-ratio), unemployment and the banks average interest rate on loans.
A semi logarithmic representation is:34
ffit = β0 + β1DTIit + β2hpriceit + β3unempit + uit (33)
34Household income, household debt and housing prices are strongly correlated as Table 5 suggests.
Consequently the following auxilliary regression is performed:
hpriceit = θ1DTIit + eit
Then an estimate of the housing prices ”cleaned” for the effect of debt is calculated as:
ĥpriceit = hpriceit − θ̂1DTIit
Correlation matrix
Variable debt income hprice
d 1.000
i 0.945 1.000
hprice 0.936 0.923 1.000
Table 5: Correlation matrix
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Table (6) presents results for the hypothesized cointegrating relationship for filed
foreclosures. The estimates on the DTI ratio and the unemployment rate are significant
and come with their expected signs. A one percentage point increase in the household
DTI ratio is found to increase the number of filed foreclosures by almost 1.5 percent, while
a one percent increase in the unemployment rate increases the number of filed foreclosure
by 0.14 percent. The estimated effect of the DTI-ratio is comparable to that of Aron
and Muellbauer (2010), who find that a one percent increase in the debt-service-ratio
increases the number of mortgage arrears with 1.6 percent.35
However the estimate on the unemployment rate is surprisingly low compared to
Aron and Muellbauer (2010). The authors find that a one percent increase in the un-
employment rate increases the number of arrears by 0.8 percent using the log of the
unemployment rate. In contrast, I find that a one percent increase in the unemployment
rate increases the number of filed foreclosures by 0.14 percent. A possible reason for the
relatively low estimate may be the higher unemployment benifit in Norway compared to
the UK.36 Yet, the estimate is not ”too” low to have economic implications. An increase
in unemployment from 2 to 4 percent, would lead to a 14 percent increase in the number
of filed foreclosures, according to my estimate.
The estimated effect of on housing prices is not significant whether it is adjusted for
common correlation or not. That said, the signs of the estimates are consistent with
predictions of the model in Section 5.
Both the Breitung test and the IPS-test rejects a panel unit root at the five per-
cent significant level, suggesting that there is evidence that a cointegrating relationship
exisits.37
Short run dynamics
Since both tests indicate cointegration, I proceed to estimate filed foreclosures in an ECM
setup. This model is based on the cointegrating relationship in Table 5:
ecmfiledit = ffit − β0 − β1DTIit − β2unempit (34)
35Aron and Muellbauer (2010) defines the debt-service ratio as the product of the mortgage interest
rate and the level of debt divided by disposable income
36Measured as the gross replacement rate the UK has a much lower unemployent insurance than in
Norway. However, the accuracy of this indicator can be debated (Howell and Rehm 2009)
37That is, when excluding housing prices from the cointegrating relationship
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Filed foreclosures 1995-2010
Cointegrating relationship
Variable Estimate Sd. Estimate Sd.
DTI 1.490 0.13 *** 1.443 0.13 ***
unemp 0.145 0.05 ** 0.098 0.043 **
ĥprice 0.196 0.18
F-test 45.75 65.62
R-squared within 0.65 0.64
Number of observations 224 224
Number of regions 14 14
Number of years 16 16
Test for stationarity in the error-correction term:
IPS -1.24 -2.81 ***
Breitumg -1.79 ** -1.77 **
Table 6: Cointegration filed foreclosures
All variables are time-demeaned and the variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. The standard
errors in the regression is clustered by region to account for any serial correlation. The tests for
stationarity include trend and are robust for cross-sectional correlation. *,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10
percent significant level respectively. In order to limit multicolinearity I use the households debt to
income ratio (log(debtit)− log(incomeit) in addition to the other variables. Furthemore, an auxiliary
regression is performed on housing prices in order to remove the common correlation shared with the
DTI-ratio
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Filed foreclosures 1995-2010
Equilibrium correction model
Variable Estimate Sd. Estimate Sd.
ecmfiledi,t−1 -0.379 0.04 *** -0.319 0.053 ***
∆ffit−1 0.100 0.101
∆DTIi,t 0.532 0.201 ** 0.582 0.175 ***
∆DTIi,t−1 -0.152 0.334
∆hpricei,t -0.362 0.138 ** -0.446 0.127 ***
∆hpricei,t−1 -0.115 0.224
∆unempi,t 0.144 0.038 *** 0.197 0.034 ***
∆unempi,t 0.079 0.06
∆Rt 0.027 0.008 *** 0.021 0.07 **
∆Rt−1 0.019 0.006 ** 0.011 0.005 **
F-value 1626.22 28.03
R-squared within 0.31 0.29
Number of observations 196 196
Number of regions 14 14
Number of years 14 14
Normality JB 2.98** 3.07**
Autocorrelation 0.23 0.24
Table 7: ECM Filed foreclosures
This model is based on the cointegrating relationship in Table 5:
ecmfiledit = lfiledit − β0 − β1DTIit − β2unemploymentit .All variables are time-demeaned and the
variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. The Jarque-Bera normality test and Wooldridge (2002)
test for autocorrelation are included. The Wooldrige test reports the p-value of the hypothesis of no
first order autocorrelation. The standard errors in the regression is clustered by region to account for
serial correlation. The left column with results refers to the general model, whereas the right column
refers to the specific model, going from general to specific by excluding the most insignificant variable
in each step. A dummy variable for 2004 and 2005 are included in the general specification of the
model due to the interpolation of the dataseries. ∆ denotes that the variable is first differenced.
*,**,*** denotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level respectively. In order to limit multicolinearity, I use
the households debt to income ratio (log(debtit)− log(incomeit)) in addition to the other variables.
∆ffit = β0 + β1∆ffi,t−1 +
1∑
j=0
δj∆xi,t−j + λ(ecm
filed
i,t−1) + uit (35)
Here, xit is a vector of [unempit DTIit hpriceit Rit].
In Table (7), the results from the ECM estimation are presented. I proceed by going
from a general model to a specific model by stepwise removing the most insignificant
variable untill only significant variables are retained. Note first that the negative, highly
significant estimate on the adjustment coefficient λ gives additional support for cointe-
gration by strongly indicating that an equilibrium correction mechanism exists (Engle
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and Granger 1987). We see that all variables come with their expected signs. The con-
temporaneous effect of an increase in the DTI-ratio of one percentage point, increases the
number of filed foreclosures by about 0.5 percent. Thus, both in the short run, and in the
long run, increases in the DTI-ratio is found to increase the number of filed foreclosures.
The short run estimates on housing prices shows a negative connection between housing
prices and filed foreclosures. This is consistent with the findings of Aron and Muellbauer
(2010), who find that an increase in the proportion of households with negative equity
increases the number of mortgage arrears by 0.1 percent.
The estimate for housing prices is interesting. It might indicate that households are
able to borrow against their house prior to receiving a filed foreclosure. However, it might
also be that a higher level of housing prices increases the households willingness to keep
the house and consequently the willingness to pay their contracted mortgage installments.
Finally, the negative impact of short run changes in unemployment and the interest rate
is consistent with the conjectures of the theoretical model of Section 5.
Estimated long run contributions
In sum, the evidence presented above is clearly consistent with the notion that the recent
increase in filed foreclosures are driven by the growth in houshold debt. Both interest
rates and the unemployment rate have remained low the last years and housing prices have
increased. Thus it seems that the growth in houshold debt is the main factor behind the
increase in filed foreclosures. This is illustrated in Figure 14, which plots the estimated
long run contribution of the DTI-ratio and the unemployment rate as a percentage of the
level of filed foreclosures. From the figure, we see that the impact of the DTI-ratio on
filed foreclosures has increased substantially the last decade.
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Figure 14: Estimated long run contributions of DTI-ratio and the unemployment rate
The figure plots the contribution of the DTI-ratio and the log unemployment rate in explaining the
level of log filed foreclosures per capita. The contribution of each variable is measured in percent of the
log of filed foreclosures per capita.
7.3 Estimating actual foreclosures
Based on the discussion in Section 5, it is expected that the number of actual foreclosures
could be seen as the number of filed foreclosures that is not refinanced by the bank (or
voluntarily sold by the household). The data gathered for this thesis does not allow me
to observe the number of households that get a refinancing deal. However, the variables
influencing this decision are observed. The relationship in equation (15) shows that the
number of filed foreclosures ending in a refinancing deal depends positively on housing
prices and negatively on household debt. Consequently, we would expect that the number
of actual foreclosures increases with household debt and decreases with housing prices as
fewer filed foreclosures ends in refinancing. Based on the presented model, the following
cointegrating relationship is hypothesized:
afit = β0 + β1ffit + β2dit + β3hpriceit + uit (36)
Table 8 presents the results obtained when estimating (36). We see that all variables
are significant and comes with their expected signs. A one percent increase in the number
of filed foreclosures is estimated to increase the number of actual foreclosures by 0.5
percent. Hence, absent any refinancing, my results indicate that as much as 50 percent
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Actual foreclosures 1995-2010
Cointegrating relationship
Variable Estimate Sd. Estimate Sd.
ff 0.549 0.173 *** 0.398 0.198 **
d -0.734 0.186 *** -0.364 0.262
ĥprice -2.459 0.552 *** -1.732 0.649 **
unemp -0.595 0.119 ***
F-value 11.89 11.89
R-squared within 0.34 0.34
Number of observations 224 224
Number of regions 14 14
Number of years 16 16
Test for stationarity in the error-correction term:
IPS -2.81 *** -2.86 ***
Breitumg -2.74 *** -3.10 ***
Table 8: Cointegration actual foreclosures
All variables are time-demeaned and the variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. In order to
limit multicolinnarity between household debt and housing prices, housing prices are ”cleaned” for debt
in the following way: ĥpriceit = hpriceit − β̂1debtit, where β̂ is estimated from a fixed effects regression
of debt on housing prices. The standard errors in the regression is clustered by region to account for
serial correlation. The tests for stationarity include trend and are robust for cross-sectional correlation.
*,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level, respectively
of the number of filed foreclosures would end up in an actual foreclosure. However, the
results also suggest that a one percent increase in housing prices reduces the number of
actual foreclosures by 2.5 percent in the long run. This clearly demonstrates that the
growth in housing prices over the last decade have kept the number of actual foreclosures
down. Finally, we see that a one percent increase in household debt loweres the number
of actual foreclosures with 0.73 percent. However, the estimate on debt is not significant
when including the unemployment rate in the specification. Thus, the data cannot be
seen to firmly support a long term impact of debt on the number of actual foreclosures.
The results are not directly comparable with that of Aron and Muellbauer (2011)
as they estimate the rate of foreclosures (repossessions) per mortgage outstanding. The
authors find that an increases in the debt-service ratio has a significant negative impact on
the possession rate, and the same for the estimated proportion of household experiencing
negative equity. Hence, the direction of the mechanisms in this thesis are consistent with
the findings of Aron and Muellbauer (2011)
Note that both Aron and Muellbauer (2011) and Astrup and Holm (2009) find a strong
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effect of unemployment on the number of foreclosures. I find that a one percent increase
in the unemployment rate increases the number of actual foreclosures by 0.5 percent.
Furthermore, when unemployment is included in the analysis, the long run estimate on
housing prices is lowered to -1.7 percent and the long run estimate on filed foreclosures
is lowered to about 0.4 percent.
The tests for a unit root in the error term is firmly rejected at a one percent significance
level, suggesting that there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables.
Short run dynamics
The following ECM is estimated for actual foreclosures:
∆afit = β0 + β1∆afit−1 +
2∑
j=0
δj∆yit−j + λ(ecm
forec
i,t−1 ) + uit (37)
Here afit is the log of the number of foreclosures per capita and y is a vector of [unempit
dit hpriceit Rit]. The equilibrium term in (38) reflects departures from the long run
cointegrating relationship in Table 7. Since the process from default to foreclosure may
take as long as 12 month, I have included two lags of each variable
ecmforecit = afit − β̂0 − β̂1ffit − β̂2dit − β̂3ĥpriceit − β̂4unempit (38)
From Table 8, we see that the equilibrium correction term is significantly negative,
which gives additional support for the existence of a cointegrated relationship. The
estimate suggest a rapid adjustment to equilibrium, where more than 70 percent of a 1
percent deviastion from equilibrium is adjusted within a year.
Moving from a general, to a specific model, we see that the short run effects are in line
with the long run estimates. A one percent increase in the numbers of filed foreclosures
increases the number of actual foreclosures by about 0.2 percent in the short run. Yet,
this estimate is somewhat uncertain as it is only significant at the 10 percent level. A one
percent increase in housing prices lowers the numbers of actual foreclosures by more than
0.75 percent in the short run while, a one percent increase in household debt increases the
number of actual foreclosures by 2.7 percent. Finally, we see that the short run impact of
unemployment and the interest rate are significant and come with their expected signs.
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Actual foreclosures 1995-2010
Equilibrium correction model
Variable Estimate Sd. Estimate Sd.
ecmforeci,t−1 -0.736 0.139 *** -0.741 0.08 ***
∆afi,t−1 -0.06 0.063
∆ffit 0.205 0.156 ** 0.206 0.115 *
∆ffi,t−1 0.072 0.114
∆ffi,t−2 -0.074 0.225
∆hpriceit -0.667 0.701 -0.774 0.361 **
∆hpricei,t−1 0.352 0.582
∆hpricei,t−2 0.006 0.509
∆dit -0.436 1.858
∆di,t−1 2.319 1.501 2.726 1.141 **
∆di,t−2 1.293 1.607
∆unempit 0.304 0.133 ** 0.269 0.116 **
∆unempi,t−1 0.782 0.180 *** 0.724 0.137 ***
∆unempi,t−2 -0.528 0.219 ** -0.609 0.159 ***
∆Rt 0.038 0.023
∆Rt−1 -0.009 0.042 0.046 0.016 **
∆Rt−2 -0.002 0.032
F-value 93.65 23.75
R-squared within 0.53 0.52
Number of observations 196 196
Number of regions 14 14
Number of years 14 14
Normality JB 9.72 10.32
Autocorrelation 0.81 0.32
Table 9: ECM Actual foreclosures
This model is based on the cointegrating relationship on the right hand sign in Table 7:
ecmforecit = afit − β̂0 − β̂1ffit − β̂2dit − β̂3ĥpriceit − β̂4unempit . All variables are time-demeaned and
the variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. The Jarque-Bera normality test and Wooldridge
(2002) test for autocorrelation are included. The Wooldrige test reports the p-value from testing the
hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation. The standard errors in the regression are clustered by
region to account for serial correlation. The left column with results refers to the general model,
whereas the right column refers to the specific model, going from general-to-specific by excluding the
most insignificant variable in each step. A dummy variable for 2004 and 2005 are included in the
general specification of the model due to the interpolation of the dataseries. ∆ denotes that the
variable is first differenced. *,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level respectively
Estimated long run contributions
Taken together, I argue that the estimation results give a plausible indication of the main
determinants behind the development in actual foreclosures. During the last five years,
the numbers of filed foreclosures has increased, while the number of actual foreclosures
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has been relatively stable. The estimation results clearly suggest that the increase in
housing prices over the last decade has kept the number of actual foreclosures low despite
the increase in filed foreclosures. The long run contribution of housing prices, the un-
employment rate and filed foreclosures are illustrated in Figure 15 and Figure 16. From
the figures, we see that the recent increase in filed foreclosures, ceteris paribus, points to
an increase in actual foreclosures as well. However, during most part of the decade, the
development in housing prices appears to have lowered the number of actual foreclosures.
This suggests that macroeconomic development, not only affects the numbers of filed
foreclosures, but also has a substantial impact on the number actual foreclosures.
Figure 15: Estimated long run contributions of housing prices and the unemployment
rate
The figure plots the contribution of the log of housing prices and the log unemployment rate in
explaining the level of log actual foreclosures per capita. The contribution of each variable is measured
in percent of the log of foreclosure per capita.
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Figure 16: Estimated long run contributions of filed foreclosures
The figure plots the contribution of the log of filed foreclosures in explaining the level of log actual
foreclosures per capita. The contribution is measured in percent of the log of foreclosures per capita.
7.4 Adjusting for panel heterogeneity
In order to see whether the results are robust to possible panel heterogeneity, I estimate
the ec-model with a regional adjustment parameter for filed and actual foreclosures, as
specified in (30). This addition, I argue, has two main benefits. First, by conducting the
heterogeneous estimation, we can asses to what extent the ”pooled” short run dynamics
from the previous sections are valid. Furthermore, this addition provides estimates on
the regional speed of adjustment, which may reveal systematic regional differences in hpw
deviations from the estimated equilibrium are adjusted. Systematic regional differences
in the adjustment coefficient could be related to the variables included in the data-
set. For instance, in regions with high levels of housing prices, a slower adjustment for
actual foreclosures could be interpreted as the banks’ being less impatient in covering
their losses. Yet, such differences could also be related to different capacities among the
regional courts.
Table 10 reports the heterogenous estimation of the number of filed foreclosures. We
see that the short run coefficients are almost identical with those reported in Table 6. That
said, when looking at Table 11, we see that the short run coefficient on household debt
is no longer significant. The adjustment coefficient in the table reveals both substantial
variation, and also a very rapid adjustment to equilibrium for a number of regions. That
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Heterogenous ECM: Filed foreclosures 1995-2010
Variable Estimate Sd.
∆DTIi.t 0.531 0.201 **
∆hpricei,t -0.484 0.126 ***
∆unempi,t 0.203 0.037 ***
∆Rt 0.021 0.008 **
∆Rt−1 0.099 0.005 **
Regional adjustment parameter
Østfold -0.218 0.03 ***
Akershus -0.176 0.04 ***
Oslo -0.227 0.04 ***
Hedmark -0.285 0.03 ***
Oppland -0.424 0.03 ***
Buskerud -0.625 0.05 ***
Vestfold -0.254 0.09 **
Telemark -0.487 0.02 ***
Agderfylkene -0.311 0.03 ***
Rogaland -0.183 0.03 ***
Hordaland -0.308 0.04 ***
Møre- og Romsdal -0.936 0.04 ***
Trøndelagsfylkene -0.379 0.03 ***
Nord-Norge -0.278 0.03 ***
R-squared within 0.32
Number of observations 210
Number of regions 14
Number of years 15
Table 10: Heterogenous ECM filed foreclosures
The estimation uses the specific ECM-model from Table 6. In order to obtain the regional adjustment
paramenter, a regional dummy has been multiplied with the estimated cointegrating relationship. All
variables are time-demeaned and the variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. The standard
errors in the regression is clustered by region to account for serial correlation. ∆ denotes that the
variable is first differenced. *,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level respectively
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Heterogenous ECM: Actual foreclosures 1995-201
Variable Estimate Sd.
∆hpriceit -0.685 0.365 *
∆di,t−1 1.850 1.285
∆unempit 0.212 0.128
∆unempi,t−1 0.699 0.138 ***
∆unempi,t−1 -0.554 0.163 ***
∆Ri,t−1 0.043 0.017 **
Regional adjustment parameter
Østfold -0.998 0.04 ***
Akershus -0.314 0.04 ***
Oslo -1.314 0.06 ***
Hedmark -1.536 0.18 ***
Oppland -0.939 0.08 ***
Buskerud -0.378 0.07 ***
Vestfold -0.723 0.04 ***
Telemark -1.063 0.06 ***
Agderfylkene -0.823 0.05 ***
Rogaland -0.411 0.04 ***
Hordaland -1.273 0.07 ***
Møre- og Romsdal -0.371 0.04 ***
Trøndelagsfylkene -0.468 0.08 ***
Nord-Norge -0.633 0.100 ***
R-squared within 0.50
Number of observations 210
Number of regions 14
Number of years 15
Table 11: Heterogenous ECM
The estimation uses the specific ECM-model from Table8. In order to obtain the regional adjustment
paramenter, a regional dummy has been multiplied with the estimated cointegrating relationship. All
variables are time-demeaned and the variables in lower case are in logs see Table 4. The standard
errors in the regression is clustered by region to account for serial correlation. ∆ denotes that the
variable is first differenced. *,**,*** dentotes the 1,5,10 percent significant level respectively
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is, in some of the regions almost all disequilibrium is corrected within a year.
Figure 17 and 18 show how the speed of adjustment varies across the different regions.
I have not been able to detect any systematic differences in these estimates. Neither does
there seem to be a connection between the regional distribution of the speed of adjustment
for filed foreclosures and that of actual foreclosures. A further point of research could be
to explore the regional heterogeneity in more detail. Within the time constraint given for
this thesis, this was not possible.
Figure 17: Regional speed of adjustment, filed foreclosures
Figure 18: Regional speed of adjustment, actual foreclosures
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis I have examined what factors may have contributed to the recent rise in in
filed and actual foreclosures in Norway. My econometric results suggest that the main
explanation behind the rapid increase in filed foreclosures is the growth in household
debt. In fact, the rise in the household debt-to-income ratio can account for as much
as 50 percent of the increase in filed foreclosures. Consequently, the growth in filed
foreclosures may be seen as a sign of increasing the debt vulnerability among Norwegian
households. This interpretation, I argue, is supported by lessons from the Norwegian
Banking Crisis of the early 1990s, as well as recent developments in other countries.
Moreover, I have documented that the increase in filed foreclosures has coincided with
an increase in recurring payment problems among Norwegian households and registered
execution procedures.
Thus far, the increase in filed foreclosures has not been followed by an equal increase in
actual foreclosures. My results suggest that one explanation of this lies in the substantial
growth in housing prices over the last decades. Based on the theoretical model developed
in this thesis, it is seen that an increase in housing prices increases the debtor’s collateral
value which has a positive effect on households’ possibility (and ability) to refinance their
debt. The conjecture is supported by my econometric results. A one percent increase in
housing prices is found to lower the number of actual foreclosures by between 1.7 and
2.5 percent in the long run. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that a much larger
fraction of the foreclosure filings would have been realized as actual foreclosures had the
development in the housing market been less favorable. Thus, a fall in housing prices is
likely to be followed by an increase in the number of actual foreclosures, which may have
severe consequences for the banking sector.
As shown in Lindquist (2011), there is a clear connection between households’ debt-
vulnerability and credit risk, which again is important for the stability of the financial
system. However, the direct effect on banks’ balance sheets from an increase in filed fore-
closures is likely to be modest. Historically, only a small share of the foreclosure filings
has been realized as actual foreclosures. Furthermore, banks’ losses from the household
sector have traditionally been low (Steigum 2004). That said, the increase in filed fore-
closure could be interpreted as a signal of an increased risk in the financial system. The
increase in filed foreclosures suggests that an increasing number of households’ already
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are struggling to meet their debt installments, despite the favorable macro-economic con-
ditions. Lindquist (2011) argues that households tend to give priority to fulfilling their
debt contract, even if this means a serious cut in private consumption. However, a cut
in consumption affects firms’ earnings, and could cause default on firms’ bank loans. If
the increase in filed foreclosures reflects an increase in households’ debt vulnerability, a
small increase in interest rates or the unemployment rate could potentially have severe
implications, as more households would cut their consumption in order to hold on to their
house.
Even though my results are indicative of an increased vulnerability among Norwegian
households, more research is needed to establish a clear link between households’ debt-
vulnerability and the foreclosure statistics. The group that experience a foreclosure is
diverse, which means that several mechanisms need to be considered in order to explain
the developments. In particular, it is possible that a non-negligible share of the actual
foreclosures is caused by firms’ bankruptcies, since many entrepreneurs use their house
as collateral for business loans.(See discussion in appendix B) Moreover, any systematic
regional differences in foreclosures could be exploited in order to enhance our knowledge.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the consumption behavior of the receivers
of foreclosures filings. To what extent are these households forced to cut back on their
consumption? Does history reveal any connection between foreclosure filings and bank
losses? Perhaps these queries could shed more light on the broader question regarding
the impact of households’ debt-vulnerability on financial fragility.
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Appendix
A: The new dataset
Actual foreclosures:
The Norwegian court administration registers the filed foreclosures within a year for
each court. If the court decides to foreclose the house, the property is registered in the
GAB register (Grunnboksregisteret), which is then sent to Statistic Norway.38 I have
gathered the data on foreclosures for each court administration from the period 1980-
1993. The data has been aggregated to a county level, where the number of foreclosures
for each court administration belonging to the same county is added. The statistics from
the court administration is merged with regional data from the GAB-register (1995-2011)
so that the numbers of foreclosures is available from 1980 – 2011. The years 1993 and
1994 are missing in this series. The data in these years are misleading since the new law
on foreclosures changed the way the court administration registered the foreclosures.
As already pointed out, it is worth noting that the number of actual foreclosures may
be substantially downward biased. A large fraction of households are forced to sell their
houses due to permanent income setbacks and subsequent failure to pay their mortgage
installments. However, households may choose to sell themselves rather than having the
court foreclose their house, and will thus not appear in the statistics.
Filed foreclosures:
The number of filed foreclosures are gathered for each court administration and aggre-
gated to the county level for the years 1980 – 2011. For the data on filed foreclosures, the
years 2004 and 2005 are missing due to a reorganization of the data collection in the court
administration. Note that the number of filed foreclosures includes statistics for housing
cooperatives. Statistics Norways’ data on filed foreclosures do not contain housing co-
operatives and are consequently lower over the sample. Astrup and Holm (2009) argues
that the numbers of filed foreclosures may be upward biased as defaulted tax claims on
a property will automatically be filed to the court even though the claims may be small.
Unfortunately, it is problematic to assess the size of this bias. Yet, the bias should not
affect the change in the number of filed foreclosures.
38After the new law on foreclosures in 1993 the actual foreclosed properties noted in GAB (Registeret
for grunneiendommer, adresser og bygninger). Prior to this it was the court administration that registered
the actual foreclosures.
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Housing prices:
Housing prices for 14 regions have been collected from the Norwegian association of
real estate Agents (NEF) and housing prices for the five largest Norwegian cities is taken
from Norges-Bank Historical monetary Statistics
Household credit:
From 1981 - 1986 the credit series are taken from the Credit Market Statistics of
Statistics Norway for private and public banks. The series is collected as loans to wage
earners. From 1986 – 2000 the credit series are taken from the ORBOF database of
Statistics Norway. Here, the series are collected as banks and credit companies loans
to households, including private non-personal enterprises, personal enterprises and self-
employed. 39
Household data:
County level data on average personal income, households’ average level of debt,
households’ average interest payments are also collected from Statistics Norway, which
uses data on household tax payments to construct these variables.
Other variables:
Finally, total population in each county and unemployment data at the county level
is taken from Statistics Norway. Only from 1995 is the working force in each county
available, so that the actual unemployment rate can only be used from 1995 and onwards.
In addition banks average yearly interest on lending is taken from Statistics Norway.
Dataset:
A full 14 region data set including debt, lending, interest payments, housing prices,
unemployment, foreclosures and filed foreclosures is available from 1995-2010. A five
region sample 1980 -2010 is available with the variables foreclosures, filed foreclosures,
household credit, numbers of unemployed, housing prices and real after tax-interest rate.
39To take account of this break in the series I have created a second series where this is corrected for.
A combined measure of private non-personal enterprises, personal enterprises and self-employed, wage
earners and state enterprises exist on a regional basis in the statistics from 1981-86. In addition for each
year the national distribution of these different sectors is collected. Using this national distribution I
have constructed a series where private non-personal enterprises, personal enterprises and self-employed
are included. The geographical variation of the distribution of these sectors will not be captured in this
estimate. Hence this is an important source of error in the series. However, comparing the two series
against each other there seems to be little difference.
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B: What characterize those who have their homes foreclosed?
Due to the relatively low numbers of actual foreclosures in Norway, one might argue that
it is really a marginal phenomenon and one might question whether the developments
in foreclosures is based mostly on the individual characteristics of the borrower. One
could for instance argue that a fraction of the population experience payment problems
regardless of the macroeconomic situation. Indeed, qualitative surveys have shown that
foreclosures in some cases are connected with drug abuse, psychiatric illness and divorce,
and the people experiencing a foreclosure are held to have poorer economic management
than the rest of the population (Astrup and Holm 2009, p 110).
However, this picture does not seem consistent when looking more closely at the
evidence. On the contrary, broad macroeconomic variables seem to have a large impact
on foreclosures, a point that is also reflected at the individual level. Astrup and Holm
(2009) uses a sample of micro-data from the debt-collection company Lindorff to look at
the individual characteristics of those who experience a foreclosure. Firstly, these people
do not seem to mainly consist of low income groups. In 2008, more than 65 percent
of the foreclosures happened to households above the lowest income quintile, and 12
percent of the foreclosures among those of the highest income quintile. Furthermore,
these households tend to have a substantially higher debt-to-income ratio than the rest
of the population. Almost 50 percent of the households experiencing a foreclosure had
a debt level of more than three times their income, and 24 percent had a debt of more
than five times their income. The age group 25 – 35 is overrepresented in the sample.
This group tends to have less housing equity and is more prone to divorce than the rest
of the population (Astrup and Holm 2009, p 120)
Secondly, there seems to be a close connection between filed foreclosures in Norway
and households’ ability to pay their bills. Figure 19 plots filed foreclosures as a share of
total lending on the right axis, and SIFOs measure of recurrent payment problems on
the left axis. 40 We see that these two variables reveal the same trend the last six years,
which indicates that the increase in filed foreclosure reflects reduced ability to pay among
households.
About half of the individuals who experienced a foreclosure in 2007 and 2008 had
commercial interest according to data from Lindorff (Astrup and Holm 2009, p 121).
40SIFO - Statens institutt for forbruksforskning
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Figure 19: Filed foreclosures and the share of households with recurring payment prob-
lems
Recurrent payment problems measures the share of households stating that they have sometimes or
often been unable to pay their bills, interest payments or mortgage installments the last year. See
Poppe(2011)
This suggests that firm’s bankruptcies may affect the number of foreclosures, since some
individuals use their house as collateral for commercial loans. Thus, the conditions in
the Norwegian business segment are likely to affect the number of foreclosures. That
said, Lindorff defines commercial interest broadly including both current and previous
owners of ANS (Ansvarlig Selskap) 41 and AS(Aksjeselskap) in addition to individuals
that are or have been members of the board of a company (Astrup and Holm 2009).
Only for the current and possible previous owners of ANS are in danger of having their
property foreclosed, should they fail to meet their debt installments. Thus, even though
many individuals who experience foreclosures have commercial interest, the commercial
interests may not be the reason for the foreclosure. However, the mechanism between
firms bankruptcies and foreclosure suggest that the number of actual foreclosures is not
a problem limited to the household sector alone. The impact from bankruptcies are not
considered in this thesis. However I argue that this as an important point of further
research.
41A ”Ansvarlig Selskap” is an association in which two or more owners (participants) together or
separately have unlimited personal liability for the business debt
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C: The bank’s decision to grant the mortgage
A vast number of empirical and theoretical papers on the housing market shows how the
borrowers collateral value affects the creditors willingness to grant a loan.42 In order to
show that the model presented is consistent with these findings, we can look at the bank’s
decision to grant a mortgage in the first place.
For simplicity, assume that the bank faces a constant funding cost c = 1 on each krone
lend on the mortgage M0. Furthermore we consider a case where the household always
chooses to stay and uphold the contract.
With probability λ, the high income is realized and the bank receives the profit ΠCb =
M0(1+r)−cM0 = rM0 With probability (1−λ),the bank chooses to foreclose or refinance.
Suppose that the bank denotes a probability pE for the case of refinance from which it
receives V Rb = min[E0(P2)−M0, M̂0−M0]. Consequently, the banks denote a probability
(1 − pE) for the case of foreclosure, where it receives ΠFb = min[E0(P1) − c,M0 − c] =
min[E0(P1) −M0,M0 −M0] in profits. With these assumptions, the expected value of
the mortgage can be written as:
E0(Π) = λrM0 +(1−λ)(pE ∗min[E0(P2)−M0, rM0]+(1−pE) min[E0(P1)−M0, 0] (39)
This profit function has a global maximum at: (see proof next page)
M0
1+r
= E0(P2)
for 1− pe(1 + r) < r < 1−λλ
This global maximum clearly depends positivly on the expected housing price E0(P ).
Consequently, a profit maximizing bank will never grant a mortgage M0 when the dis-
counted value of the mortgage exceeds the expected period housing value in period two,
i.e. M0
1+r
> E0(P2). Thus, under these assumptions, the banks willingness to extend a
mortgage, depends on the expected collateral value of the borrower. 43
Since the value ofM0 that maximizes the expected profit function depends on expected
housing prices, it follows from the presented model that a household’s possibility to
42See for instance Bernanke and Getler (1989), Kyataki and Moore (2000) and Borgersen and Som-
mersvoll (2010) for theoretical contributions. For an empirical investigation of Norwegian data see
Anundsen and Jansen(2011), and for other countries see for instance Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2004)
and Oikarinen (2009)
43In order for 1−λλ > (1− pe(1 + r), I assume that 1 > [1− pe(1 + r]λ which appears reasonable as λ
and pe are probabilities which consequently cannot exceed one and r is a small number
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Figure 20: Expected profit function
Where A : M0 = E0(P1) and B : M0 =
M0
1+r = E0(P2) for r <
1−λ
λ and E0(P2) > E0(P1)
borrow is constrained by the collateral value. Hence, when housing prices increases,
households’ will be able to increase their borrowing. These conjectures is consistent with
both empirical and theoretical work on the housing market.
This global maximum clearly depends positivly on the expected housing price E0(P ).
The profit function is drawn in Figure 20 for 1 − pe(1 + r) < r < 1−λλ . The point A is
where the mortgage equals the expected housing price in period t = 1, E0(P1) = M0, and
point B is where the discounted mortgage equals the expected housing price in period
t = 2. i.e. M0
1+r
= E0(P2).
Proof
For simplicity, assume that E0(P2) = E0(P1) = E0(P ). To find the banks expected
profit maximum, I take the derivative of E0(Π) with respect to M0 and find the point
in which the derivative of the function goes from positive to negative. The function
E0(Π) has two ”kinks” where it fails to be differentiable since the tagent slopes do not
apporach the same value from the left as they do from the right. The first ”kink” is where
E0(P ) −M0 = 0 ⇔ M0 = E0(P ) at the value of M0 where the second min-function in
E0(Π) shifts from 0 to E0(P )−M0. The second ”kink” is where E0(P )−M0 = rM0 ⇔
M0
1+r
= E0(P ) at the value of M0 where the first min-function in E0(Π) shifts from rM0
to E0(P ) −M0. Thus, in order to find the derivative of the function E0(Π), three cases
needs to be concidered. First when M0 < E0(P ), second, when E0(P ) < M0 < E0(1 + r)
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and third when E0(1 + r) < M0.
1. δE0(Π)
δM0
= λr + (1− λ)per > 0 for r > r > 0, since the probabiliies λ and pe > 0.
2. δE0(Π)
δM0
= λr + (1− λ)[per − (1− pe) > 0 for r > [1− pe(1 + r](1− λ)
3. δE0(Π)
δM0
= λr − (1− λ) < 0 for r < 1−λ
λ
Thus there exist a global maximum for the function E0(Π) at the point
M0
1+r
= E0(P )
for 1− pe(1 + r) < r < 1−λλ .44
44The assumption that r < 1−λλ seems reasonable as competition in the banking sector may limit the
interest the bank may charge.
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